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Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta:
Do Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 Require a
Misstatement or Omission?
Rodney D. Chri.rman

STONERIDGE V. SCfEN71FlC-ATLANTA:

Do SECTION IOCB)

AND RULE lOB-5 REQUIRE A MISSTATEMENT OR
OMISSION?
Rodney D. Chrisman"
INTRODUCTION

On March 26, 2007, the Supreme Court granted certioran 1I1
Stoneridge fnvestl11ellf Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, fnc.,l a case
that many viewed as having the potential to produce the most important
Supreme Court securities law decision since the landmark case of
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First fllferstate Bank of Denver, N.A?
Prior to the opinion coming down, and even prior to oral arguments,
Stone ridge drew an unusual amount of attention for a rather technical
securities law case.) Commentators described Stoneridge as "the most

* Assistant Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law. B.B.A. 1998,
Eastern Kentucky University; J.D. 2001, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author
would like to thank Professor F. Philip Manns for his encouragement, support, and ideas, and
Brandon S. Osterbind and Daniel A Sanders for their invaluable research assistance. The
author would also like to thank his wife, Heather, and children, Sierra, Lexie, Torie, and Eli.
for making the time for him to complete this Article. Finally, the author would like to thank
the Lord Jesus Christ for saving his soul and giving him the strength and grace in which to
stand.
1. III re Chaner Commc'ns, Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cif. 2006), cert. grallled, 127
S. Ct. 1873 (2007), alld (~frd sub 1I01ll. Stoneridge Inv. Panners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 128 S. Cl. 761 (2008).
2. Cent Bank of Denver v. Firsllnterstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
3. See, e.g., S//prl!l1le COlfrl to He{/}· Third-Party Securities Suir, WALL ST. J.
NEWSWIRE, OCl. 5, 2007. htlp:iionlinc.wsj.comipubliciartic\eiSB 119160737138050333.h1011
(calling the case "high-profile" and noting that it "'has drawn an unusual amount of politically
charged interest") (published before oral arguments); Karu Scannell, Big-!l1ollcy Battle Pits
BI/silless I's. Trial Bar, WALL ST. J., Ocl. 9, 2007, at Al ("The Supreme Court is wading into
one of the most intense battles ever waged between two deep-pocketed enemies: the trial bar
and big business.") (published on the day of oral arguments); Richard Brust ct al., The
Company Lille, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2007, at 50, 52 ("Few business cases have been as highly
anticipated as Slollcritige, which could become one of the court's most important securities
cases in at least a decade.") (published after oral arguments).
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important securities case in a decade, with ripple effect in the billions,""
"securities law's Roe ]I, Wude,"s "[maybe] the business case of the
year,"" and "the biggest securities-litigation court clash in a generation,,,7
The case garnered such attention not only for its extremely important
implications for securities law in general, but for its implications for the
defrauded shareholders in the Enron debacle 8 In this regard, Senator
Arlen Specter (R., PAJ stated, "[t]he outcome of Sioneridge will
determine whether tens of thousands of Enron investors will secure a
.
day in court. ,,9
As noted in the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, the issues
presented in Siolleridge arise in the wake of the Court's opinion in
4. Nina Totenberg, Detainee Rights to Top Supreme COlifl Docket, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO, Oct. 1, 2007, hup://www.npLorgllemplatcs/story/story.php?SloryJd=:::: 14820563 (citing

Professor Donald Langcvoorl).
5.

Roe

ld. (quoting Professor Langevoort, who said that calling Stonericige "securities Jaw's

Wade" is "only a little bit ofhyperbolc").
6. Op-Ed., A Class Acrioll ScheJlJe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2007, at A2D.
7. Op-Ed., Call Shareholders Sue Third Parties?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2007, at A19.
8. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d

1'.

372 (5th Cir. 2007) (ruling that the Enron shareholders cannot re<.:over against Enron's banks
because a misstatement or omission is required for liability under § lO(b) and Rule lUb-5),
cal. denied, 128 S. Ct.. 1120 (2008); see (J/so Daniel A. McLaughlin, Liabiliry Under IOb5(a) & (e), 31 DEL. ], CORP. L 631, 645 (2006) (stating that III re Ellroll Corp. Sec.,
Derivative & ERISA Lilig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002), has served as the "LCmplate
for theories of 'scheme' liability").
9. See Call Shareholders Slie Third Par/ies, supra note 7. Senator Specter's sympathy
for the Enron shareholders is in many ways understandable; however, relying upon that alone
to rule in flJvor of the plaintiffs in SlOlleririge would have epitomized the old adage "bad facts
make bad law." In explaining its ruling against the same Enron shareholders mentioned by
Senator Specter, despite the difficult and sympathetic factual situation, the Fifth Circuit stated:
V'le recognize, however, that our ruling on legal merit may nol coincide,
particularly in the minds of aggrieved fonner Enron shareholders who have lost
billions of dollars in a fraud they allege was aided '-Incl abetted by the defendants at
bar, with notions of justice and fair play. We acknowledge that the courts'
interpretation of !O(b) could have gone in a different direction and might have
established liability for the actions the banks arc alleged to have undertaken.
Indeed. one of oLlr siSler circuits - the Ninth - believes that it did. We have applieu
the Supreme Court's guidance in ascribing a limited interpretation to the words of §
10, viewing the statute as the result of Congress's balancing of competing desires to
provide for some remedy for seclllilies fraud without opening the JloodgatC's for
nearly unlimited and frequently unpredictable liability for secondury aClOrs in the
securities markets.
Regents, 482 F.3d at 393. The Supreme Court in its opinion in SlOl1eridgc does not address its
implications for the Enron investors. Seven days later, however, the Supreme Court relied on
SlOlIeridge to deny ccrtiorari in the Enron case, thereby allowing the decision of the Firth
Circuit to stand and effectively ending the bid of the Enron shareholders to hold the
investment banks in the Enron debacle liable. Regents of the Univ. or Cal. v. Merrill Lynch.
US S. Cl. 1120 (2008).

*
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Central Bailie 10 In that case, the Court shocked most observers of and
commentators lion sec untIes law by overturning long-standing,
unanimous circuit court precedent by holding that, based upon the
statutory language of § I O(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("§
lO(b)"),12 there exists no private cause of action for aiding and abetting a
primary violation of Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule
IOb-5 ("Rule IOb-5,,).13 Since all of the circuits had adopted aiding and

10. Stoneridge Inv. Partners. LLC v. Scienlific-Atlanta, Inc., 127 S_ Ct. 1873 (2007).
11. While most commentators before and since Centra! Bank have embraced and
argued for aiding and abetting liability, Professor Fischel correctly anticipated that the rulings
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hoelifelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and Sallfa Fe Indlls., Inc. v. Cree/I, 430
U.S. 462 (1977), would ultimately lead to the rejection of aiding and abetting liability under §
lO(b), Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Ullder Section lOeb) of the SeclIrities Act (~f
1934,69 CAL. L. REV. 80,82 (1981). The Celltral Balik ruling made Professor Fischel au[ to
be a prophet. See also W.O. Akin v. Q-L Invs., Inc., 959 F.2d 521. 525 (5th CiLI992)
("There is a powerful argument that ... aider and abettor liability should not be enforceable
by private parties pursuing an implied right of action."); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin,
Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding Ulat a defendant must commit a
manipulative or deceptive act in order to be liable under § lOb and Rule IOb-5, which
essentially forecloses any liability for aiders and abettors); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.ld
1301, 1311 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that a broad expansive reading of Rule lOb that
incorporales "add-on" theories of liability, such as aiding and abetting, has been rejected by
the Supreme Court, and that the court must apply a strict statutory construction); LillIe v.
Valley Nat'! Bank of Ariz_, 650 F.2d 218, 220 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The stailis of aiding and
abetting as a basis for liability under the securities laws [was] in some doubt."); Benoay v.
Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 495 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("It is also doubtful that a claim for 'aiding
and abelling' ... will continue to exist under 10(b)."), qlf'd, 735 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984).
12. 15 U.S.c. § 78j (2000). Section lO(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, ...
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe ....
hI.

13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). Section lO(b) is not selr-executing, but instead
depends upon "such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe," 15 U.S.c. § 78j, to
carry it into action. Accordingly, the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 which provides as
[ollows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material facl or to omit to slate a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made. not misleading, or
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abetting liability, I" there had been no serious consideration prior to
Cel1lmi Bank as to the contours of primary liability as opposed to
secondary liabiliti 5 under Rule lOb-S because secondary actors were
almost always held liable as aiders and abettors of the primary
violation. 16 Accordingly, the decision in Central Ballk created a great

(c) To engage in any act, pruclice, or course of business which operates or would
operille as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. ~ 240.IOb-5.
14. See. e.g .. Levine v. DiamanlhuSel. Inc., 950 F.2d 1478. 1483 (91h Cir. 1991); K & S
P'ship v. Coni' I Bank. N.A .. 952 F.ld 971, 977 (81h Cir. 1991): Schalz v. Rosenberg. 943
F.ld 485. 495 (41h Cir. 1991); Fine v. Am. Snlar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (51h Cir.
1990); Schlifkc v. Seafirsl Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989); Schneberger v. Wheeler.
859 F.ld 1477, 1480 (111h Cir. 1988); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (61h Cir.
1987); Cleary v. Pcrfeclllllc. inc .. 700 F.2d 774, 777 (lSI Cir. 1983); lIT, Inl'l Inv. Trusl v.
Corni"eld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Con sol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d
793. 799 (3d Cir. 1978); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731,740 (I Olh Cir. 1974).
The Federal Circuit for the District of Columbia never directly recognized aiding and abetting
liability, hut suggested that it would likely do so in Zoclsell F. Arrllllr Andersen & Co., 824
F.ld 27. 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Seventh Circuit ilpplied a test different from those used
in the other circuits in thal il required tim! the aider and <tbettor "commit one of the
'manipulative or deceptive' acts prohibited under seclion lOeb) and rule lOb-5 ...." Robin v.
Arlilur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7lh Cir. 1990),
15. Generally, the issuer of a security is termed the "primary actor." The term
"secondary actor" can include a multitude of parties who arc in some way connected to the
alleged fraud, including officers, direclOrs, indenture trustees, lawyers, accountants,
underwriters, investment bankers, and, now, even vendors, among others. For purposes of
this Article, "secondary actors" can encompass any of these parties. A "primary violator" is
any person who has violated § lOeb) and Rule 10b-5. These so-called "secondary actors"
traditionally have been held liable under various theories of secondary liability, characterized
by Professor Daniel Fischel as "judicially implied civil liability which has been imposed on
defendants who have nol themselves been held to have violated the express prohibition of the
securities statute at issue, but who have some relationship with the primary wrongdoer."
Fischel, supra note II, at 80 n.4. Following Cclltral Bank, in civil liability cases, there
appears to be no such thing as "secondary liability" under § lO(b) and Rule IOb-5; insteml, for
a primary or secondary actor to be liable, both primary and secondary acton; must be primary
violators. See Rodney D. Chrisman, Note, "Bright Lil1e," "Substantial Participation, " or
Somethillg Else: \1//10 Is A Prim(fJY \fiolator UI/der Rule 10b-5?, 89 Ky. L.l. 201, 201 n.2
(2001 ).
16. Before this decision, the question whether a secondary actor was a primary violator
or merely an aider and abettor was "largely academic," because every federal circuit
recognized the aiding and abetting cause of action. Chrisman, sllpra note 15, at 202 (quoting
III re MTC Elecs. Tech. S'holclcrs Lilig .. 898 F. Supp, 974, 985 (E.D.N.Y, 1995), "'lea ted ill
part Oil recollsideration hy, 993 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A.
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 192 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, the courts had not developed a clear standard for determining when a secondary
actor's conduct rose to the level of a primary violation.
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deal of uncertainty with regard to the liability of secondary actors under
Rule lOb-S n
Therefore, following Ce11lral Bank, commentators and the lower
courts have struggled mightily to delineate the line between primary and
secondary liability. IS While the emerging conflict came in two separate
waves, the primary issue throughout has been whether § IOCb) requires
that a defendant actually make a misstatement or omission in order to be
held liable as a primary violator under Rule lOb-S. 19 This issue was first

17. Compare 111 re Charler Camme'ns, Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) ("[Tlhe
district court properly dismissed the claims against the Vendors as 1l00hing morc than claims,
barred by Celltral BOllk, that the Vendors knowingly aided and abetted the Charter defcmlants
in deceiving the investor plaintiffs."), with Simpson v. AOL Time Warner. Inc., 452 F.3d
1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (,,[Tla be liable as a primary violator of § 10(b) for panieipation in
a 'scheme to defraud,' the defendant must have engaged in conduct that had the principal
pl/Tpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact in furtherance of the scheme."
(emphasis added)), overntled ill part by Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008), and disagreed with ill III re Parmalat, 414 F. Supp. 2d 428, 433
(S.D.N.Y 2006) (holding that a misrepresemation or omission is not necessary when thc
plaintiffs are proceeding under Rule lOb-5(a) or (c». In Stolleridg£', the Supreme Court
affirmed the opinion of the Eighth Circuit, albeit arguably on different grounds. COl/1pare
Stol1eridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769, with StoJleridge, 128 S. Ct. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Further, the Court appears to ovclTule Parmalat by citing it as an example of reasoning that
thc Court rejected. ld. at 770.
18. See discussion if~rra Part II and note 61. See also Nicholas Fortunc Sehanbaum,
Note, Scheme Liability: Rule IOh-5(a) awl Secondary Actor Liability After Central Bank, 26
REV. LInG. 183,184 (2007); Taavi Annus, Scheme Liability Under § /O(b) of the Securities
£,challge Act (d 1934, 72 MO. L. REV. 855 (2007); Jill E. Fisch, The Scope "f Primle
SeclJrities Litigatioll: III Search of Liability STalldards For Secondary Defelldallts, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1293 (1999); Robert S. De Lcon, The Fallit Lilies BetweelJ Prill/ary Liability alld
Aiding (mel Abetting Claims Ullder Rille JOb-5, 22 1. CORP. L. 723, 729-33 (1997); Robert A.
Prentice, Loclltillg that "Jlldislillct" alld "Virlllal/y NOllexistellt" Line BeIll'cen Primary alld
Secolldllry Liability Ullder Sectio/l IO(b). 75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 723-26 (1997); Fischel, supra
note II, at 82 (interpreting pre-1981 Supreme Court decisions as indicating "that thc theory of
secondary liability is no longer viable"). See also Regents or the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit
Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th eif. 2007) (adopting the test); Cfllmer,
443 F.3d at 992 (cssentially adopting the bright-line test by concluding that the only conduct
proscribed by § lOCb) is a' misstatement or an omission with a duty to disclose); SilllPsoll, 452
F.3d at 1040 (adopting the scheme liability test); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d
169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (adopting lhe bright line test), cert. dellied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999);
Dannenberg v. Paine\Vcbber Inc. (In re Softwarc Toolworks Inc.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1994) (adopting the substantial participation test); III re Kendall Square Research Corp.
868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994) (adopting the bright line lest); Vosgcrichian v.
Commodore Int'l, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that the accountanlmadc
a misstatement, which is a violation 0[" § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and seemingly adopting the
bright line test); III re ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. 960, 967-68 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Celltral
Ballk).
19. See illfra Part H.B. I do not include the rule here because it is clear thm Rule IOb5(a) and (c) by their plain language reach beyond just misstatements and omissions. It i.'I also
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addressed immediately following Central Bank in the context of
deciding upon a test for primary liability of secondary actors under §
21
IOCb) and Rule lOb_S. 20 The Circuits split on this issue.
Then,
corporate securities scandals such as Enron rocked the securities world. 22
These scandals shined a bright light on the issue of secondary actor
liability because they involved numerous secondary actors exhibiting
varying degrees of culpability, and the corporations themselves were
typically insolvent. 23 This gave rise to a strong desire on the part of the
plaintiffs' bar to find someone with "deep pockets" and some form of
recovery for jilted shareholders. The search inevitably led to secondary
actors such as lawyers, accountants, investment banks, and, as in the
Slolleridge case, even vendors finding themselves in the crosshairs of the
plaintiffs' bar."4
Out of this environ emerged a new theory of liability seeking
primary liability for secondary actors who have not made misstatements
or omissions."5 This theory, commonly known as "scheme liability,"
relies on Rule lOb-Sea) and (cl to hold secondary actors primarily liable
26
even when they have not made misstatements or omissions
Scheme
liability is not premised upon misstatements or omissions made by the
defendants, but rather upon the secondary actor's alleged involvement in
a scheme to defraud. 27 Accordingly, scheme liability requires an answer
to the question whether § lO(b) requires a misstatement or omission for
primary liability. The circuits again split over this issue,2g and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stolle ridge to answer the question:

clear, however, that the plain language of the rule goes beyond the reach of the statute.
Accon.lingly, the focus is on the staLUte. See ilifm notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
20. See iJlji-a notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
21. See slIpra note 18.
22. See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 644 (opining that the Enron situation is the most
sensational securities fraud case ever).
23.
Id. See iF~fr{/ notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
24. Scannell, .wpm nOle 3.
25.
See lI!fra Part I1.B.
26. See i/~rra Part l1.B.
27.
Sce iJzjr(l Purt II.B.
28.
See supra nole 18. The Ninth Circuit purports that its opinion in Simpso/1 is
consistent with the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Charter. The Eighth Circuit, however,
purports to reject scheme liability while the Ninth Circuit embraces it and even proposes a lest
for it. Further, as the Firth Circuit noted in Regents of the U11iversity of Califomia, "the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits have split with rcspect to the scope of primary liability for
secondary actors." Regcnts of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482
F.3d 372, 386 (5th CiT. 2007). In a footnote to the quoted sentence, the Court compared the
Ninth and Eighth Circuit opinions as follows:

2008]
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I.w.lhethcr [Central Bank] forecloses claims for deceptive conduct under §
10(b) ... and Rule IOb·5(a) and (c) ... where [the secondary actors] engaged
in transactions with a public corporation with no legitimate business or
economic purpose except to innate artificially the public corporation's
financial statements, but lI'here I the secondarv actors) themselves mode /10
.
.
I
. ·29
fJll)
IIIe stalcmellfs concenllllg t lOse transactIOns.

With the issue framed in this way, Stolle ridge presented the central issue
plaguing the lower courts since Cent ral Bank: does § \O(b) require that a
secondary actor actually make a misstatement or omission in order to be
held liable as a primary violator under the Rule IOb-5 implied cause of
action?3n
Accordingly, in Stone ridge, the Court had an opportunity to resolve
much of the uncertainty resulting from Central Bank by answering the
question presented in the affirmative. This certainly would have
invalidated scheme liability. Further, the Court's answer would have
provided a great deal of clarity and guidance for the lower courts as to
the proper test for determining the line between secondary and primary
COlllpare Si/IJpson \'. AOL Tillie \Vomer IIIC., 452 F.3d 1040, [048 (9th CiT. 2006)
("[T]o be linblc as a primary violator of § lOeb) for participation in a 'scheme to
defraud,' the defendant must have engaged in conduct that had the principal
purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of faet in furtherance of the
scheme .... "), with III re Charter COIIII/1C'11S, IIlC., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir.
1006) ("[Alny defendant who does not make or affirmatively cause to be macle a
fraudulent statement or omission, or who does not directly engage in manipUlative
securities trading practices, is at most guilty of aiding and abclling and cannot be
held liable under § lO(b) or any subpart of Rule IOb·5 ....").
Id. at 387 n.24.
Further, in discussing the Ninth Circuit's attempt to distinguish Charter from its
own opi nion, the Fifth Circui t stated, "[ilf there is a distinct difference between the culpability
of defendants' actions based on the pleadings in those two cases, it ill not apparent to LIS." Id.
at 392. The Supreme Court agreed, noting, "[dlecisions of the Courts of Appeals are in
connie! respecting when, if ever, an injured investor may rely upon § lOeb) to recover from a
party that neither makes a public misstatement nor violates a duty to disclose but cloe:;;
participate in a scheme to violate § IO(b)." Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 128 S. Cl. 761, 7fj7 (2007).
Obviollsly, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this split in favor of the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits in Stoneridge. The Court in StolJeridge afnrmed the Eighth Circuit's
opinion in Clwrfer, and in a matter of days denied certiorari in Regellts (allowing the Fifth
Cin.:uit's opinion to stand) and vacated the Ninth Circuit's opinion in SilllPson, remanding it
for further consideration in light of SUJlJeridgc. Id,; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill
Lynch, 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008); Avis Budget Group, Inc. v, Cal. State Teachers' Retirement
Sys., 128 S. Cl. 1119 (2008).
29. Petition for Writ of CertioraIi, Stoncridge lnv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06.43) (emphasis added). The Court granted the petition and
accepted the issue as stated in Stoneridgc's Petition.
30. See discllssion iI!fra Part [I.
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liability under § IO(b) and Rule IOb-S. Such an answer would also have
been in agreement with the understanding of many commentators and
members of the securities bar prior to the rise of scheme liability. But,
alas, the Court chose instead to ignore much of its own precedent, and
issued a rather tortured opinion arguably arriving at the same result,
albeit relying upon a strained analysis of the reliance element.
This Article begins by discussing the Central Ballk decision as it
gives rise to the question presented in Stoneridge. 31 The next part
analyzes the tests initially adopted by the lower courts immediately
following Central Bank. 32 In light of Supreme Court precedent and the
lower courts differing interpretations, this Article analyzes the circuit
court cases addressing scheme liability before considering scheme
liability in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Stoneridge. This
Article then considers whether § 1O(b) and related authority prior to
Stoneridge required that a secondary actor actually make a misstatement
or omission in order to be held liable as a primary violator of Rule IOb5 33 Finally, this Article discusses how the Supreme Court's opinion in
Stoncridge answered this question, and the reasoning behind the answer
.
]4
gIven:
1. CENTRAL BANK AND ITs WAKE

Central Bank is arguably the most influential Supreme Court case
regarding the liability of secondary actors in private securities lawsuits. 35
This landmark opinion caused seismic shifts in private securities
litigation, and raised many issues that remain the topic of much debate
and disagreement among commentators and the lower courts 3fi The
Sec infra Part 1.
See iI~fra Part Il.A.
See il/fra Part Ill.
See iI/Fa Part IV.
See, e.g., R. Brel Beattie, The Nell' Minefield: Tire Scheme Theory of Primary
Lillbility C011les of Age ill the Post~ElJrrm Era, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. 2 (2006) (describing Celltro!
Balik as a "watershed decision ... sending a happy shockwave through the securities bar by
eliminating liability against so-called secondary actors"); Celia R. Tuylor, Breaking the Bank:
Reconsiderillg Central Bank of Denver After EnrOll and Sarbaf/es-O:dey, 71 MO. L REV. 367,
370 (2006) ("Cel/tml Ballk changed the playing field dramatically and marked the end of
straight-forward aiding and abetting liability."); Scan Siamas, PrinulI]' Secllrities Fralld
Liability for Secondl1JJ' Actors: Revisitil1g Central Bank of Denver ill the Wake of EnTail,
War/deolll, and Art/wr Anderson, 37 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 895 (2004); Fiscil, supra note 18.
36. See Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope ofCondllct Prohibited by Section 10(b)
alld fhe EleJllcms of Rule 10b-5: Reflections 011 Securities Fraud (/ud SccondwJ' Acrors, 53
CATH. U. L. REV. 667, 667 (2004) ("[The Court's decision in Celllral Balik) produced a major
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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issue presented in Stolle ridge forces the Court to confront the application
of Central Ballk to scheme liability under § 10(b) and Rule IOb-5(a) and
(e). Accordingly, this Anicle begins by discussing the Court's opinion
in Central Bank."
In Centro I Ballk, Central Bank of Denver was an indenture trustee 3R
for a bond issue by the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building
Authority ("Authority,,)39 The bonds required that certain land held
subject to their assessment liens be worth at least 160% of the total
outstanding principal and interest on the bonds."o The bond also
required AmWest Development to give Central Bank of Denver an
annual report evincing satisfaction of the 160% test."1 After several
unchanged reports during a period of generally declining property
values, Central Bank of Denver became aware that there was a
substantial possibility that the test was not being met. However, Central
Bank, on the encouragement of AmWest, waited to perform an
independent review of the appraisals until after the closing 0 f a
subsequent bond issue."" Before Central Bank of Denver's auditor
performed that independent review;13 the Authority defaulted on its
bonds."" In addition to Central Bank of Denver, the plaintiff bond
purchasers sued the Authority, an AmWest director, an underwriter, and
others, but the case before the Supreme Court primarily involved the
issue of whether Central Bank of Denver could be held liable as an aider
and abettor 45

upheaval in securities law ... upcnd[ingj decades of lower court decisions that recognized

aiding and abetling claims, and engencler[ing] substantial scholarly criticism."). See

."IIP/V

notes J 6-l S and accompanying tcxl.

37. Much or the following discussion is drawn and adapted from my earlier article on
second,lry liability under Rule 10b-S. Chrisman, SlIjJrtI note IS, at 203-06.
38. An indenture trustee can be thought of as a "third party administrator" of the
indenture, or debt contract. The indenture sets out the rights and duties of all the partics
involved, including the duties of the indenture trustee, which is usually a bank that acts as the
agent fur the individual public bond holders handling such duties as monitoring the terms of
the indenture. THO/vIAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 19.1, at 726-27
(5th ed. 2005).
39. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. V. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 167
( 1994).

40.
41.

42.

ld.
ld.
ld. at 167-6S.

43.

CClIlrtll Bunk, 511 U.S. at 168.

44.

ld.
Id. at 167-69. Interestingly, the issLle of the validity of aiding ami abetling was not
inilially challenged by either party in the petition for certiorari. !d. at 194-95 (Stcvens, L
dissenting). Apparcmly, Centra! Bank of Denver had concluded that it could not prevail hy
45.
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The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that in § IO(b) and
Rule 10b-S cases, the Court "confront[s] two main issues.,,·16 In stating
and confronting these issues, the Court divided its § IO(b) and Rule lObS methodology into a two-part analysis. The fIrst part of the analysis
involves determining whether the complained of actions fall within "the
scope of conduct prohibited by § lO(b).'>'!7 For this part, "the text of the
statute controls ... [because] adherence to the statutory language ... [is]
'[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute,,,48
However, "[w]hen the text of § lOeb) does not resolve a pill1icular issue,
[the Court] attempt[s] to infer 'how the 1934 Congress would have
addressed the issue had the lOb-S action been included as an express
provision in the 1934 Act. ",49 Before the Court could address the
second issue, it had (0 determine whether the conduct fell within the
scope of prohibited conduct under § 1O(b).
Since § lO(b) is not self-executing but requires "such rules and
regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe,,50 to CillTY it into action, "in
cases where the defendant has committed a violation of § lO(b)," the
second part of the analysis requires determining whether the defendant's
conduct satisfies the remaining elements of the Rule IOb-S cause of
action 5t Clearly, the language of the statute also informs the elements

challenging aiding and abetting, bUl was instead arguing that "an indenture trustee could [not]
be found liable as an aider and abeltor absent 11 breach of an indenture agreement or other duty
under slate law, and lthat] it could [not] be liable as an aider and abellor based only on a
showing of recklessness." Cel/fral Balik, 51 J U.S. at 194. In the grant of certiorari, however,
the Supreme Court stated, "lUn addition to [a question presented in the petition for certiorari],
the parties arc directed first to brief and argue the following question: 'Whether there is an
implied private right of action for aiding and abetting \'ioiutions of Section lO(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule IOb-5.'" Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A .. v. First
Interstate Bank or Denver. N.A., 50S U.S. 959, 959 (1993).
46. Cell/ral Balik, 511 U.S. all72.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 173 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. ISS, 197 (1976».
49. ld. at 178 (quoting Musick, Peeler, & Garren v. Employers Ins. of Wausau. 508
U.S. 286, 294 (1993)). The Court wen I on to slate that in detennining how the 1934 Congress
would have uddressed the issue, the Court
users] the express causes of action in the securities Acts as the primary model for
the § lO(b) action. The reason is evident: Had the 73d Congress enacted a private §
lO(b) right of action, it likely would have designed it in a manner similar to the
other private rights of action in the securities Acts.
Id. (citing Mllsick, Peeler, 50S U.S. at 294,97).
50. 15 U.S.CA § 78j(b) (West 2006).
51. Celliral Bank. 511 U.S. at 172.
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of the implied private cause of action under the rule. 52 However, the
language of the rule cannot extend the reach of the statute 53
In applying this methodology to the facts of the case, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court, held:

*

In
IO(b), Congress prohibited manipulative or deceptive acts in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities. It envisioned that the SEC would
enforce the statutory prohibition through administrative and injunctive actions.
Of course, a private plaintiff now may bring suit against violators or § IOCb).
But the private plaillt(f{ flJay flot britlg a lOb suit against a defelldall! for £lets
/lot prohibited by the text of § 10(b) .... We have ret,!Sed to allow IOb-5
54
challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute.
H

)

Following this logic, the Court reasoned that because the text of § I O(b)
does not reach aiding and abetting, there is no aiding and abetting cause
of action under § 10(b).55 Consequently, there could be no aiding and
abetting under Rule IOb-5 because a rule cannot exceed the authority of
its enabling statute.
Although unnecessary to the resolution of the case, the Court also
compared the implied cause of action under Rule IOb-5 with the express
causes of action in the 1934 Act. Based upon this comparison, the Court
concluded:
From the 1'act that Congress did not attach private aiding and abetting liability
to any of the express causes of action in the securities Acts, we can infer that
Congress likely would not have attached aiding ~nd abetting liability to § lOCh)
had it provided a private § I O(b) cause of action.,6

Even though the Supreme Court unambiguously eliminated the
pri vate cause of action for § lO(b) aiding and abetting violations, and, by
52.
,)'ee, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199-201 (looking at the statute in order to
develop the scienter requirement).
53.
Id. at 213-14 ("The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged
\vith the administration of i.l. federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is the
power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.
Thus, despite the broad view of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case, [the rule's]
scope cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § lO(b):(citations omitted)). See 01.10 United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997) ("Liability
under Rule 1Ob-5, our precedent indicates, does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by §
10(b),s prohibition.") (citing Ernst & Emst, 425 U.S. at 213-14; Central Bank, 511 U.S. at
173).
54.
Cellfra/ Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55.
Id. at 177 ("Il is inconsistent \Vith settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend
liability beyond the scope of the conduct prohibited by the slatutory text.").
56. Id.at 179.
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extension, eliminated all forms of secondary liability under § I O(b),57 the
Court did not let secondary actors off the hook altogether.
In
summarizing its holding, the Court stated:
Because the text of § IO(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we hold til,ll
a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § IO(b).
The absence of § IO(b) aiding and abetling liability does not mean thal
secondary actors in the securities markets arc always free from liability under
the securities Acts. Any person or entity, incJu~ing a lawyer, accountant, or
bunk, who employs a 11lollipu/atil'c device or makes a material miSSf{/fCIIIClli
(or omission) on which n purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable
as a primllry violator under 1Db-5, assuming all of the requirements for
primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are mel. In any c9mplex securities fraud,
moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators ....J8

Thus, while the Court by its holding in Central Bank seemed to provide
a definitive answer that there is no secondary liability under § lO(b) and
Rule IOb_S,59 its conclusion raised another question that proved to be
more perplexing for the lower courts: when does a secondary actor's
conduct rise to the level of a primary violation?60 To answer this

57. fd. at 200-OJ (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting thal the reasoning of the Court with
regard to aiding and abeuing "would sweep away" other forms of secondary liability not
expressly provided for in the statutes, such as conspiracy, respondeat superior, and other
common law agency principles). Congress apparently agreed and in the Private Securities
1.0(e) to the 1934 Act, specifically authorizing SEC
Litigation Reform Act added
enforcemenl actions against knowing aiders and abettors. 15 U.S.CA. § 7St (\-Vest 2006).
See also Regenls of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372.
386 (5th CiL 2007) (noting that in Cellfral Bank, "the Court conclusively foreclosed the
application of secondary liabilily under § lO(b) [but] stated that secondary actors cun be liable
as primary violators in some circumstances"). The problem arises in that "[t]he Co un has
never ... precisely delineated the boundary between primary and secondary liability" anu "the
lower courts have struggled to do so ...." fd.
58.
Cellfra! Balik, 511 U.S. at 191 (first emphasis added) (citing Fischel, supru note II,
at 107-08).
59. Controlling person liability, a special type of secondary liability, survives Celllra!
Bllllk. Section 20 orthe 1934 Act holds a "controlling person" jointly and severally liable for
doing an "act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under the provisions
of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder through or by means of any olher person."
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.c. ~ 78t(b»). See
also 9 LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION
II-D-I (3d cd. 2004)
(discussing how control person liability survives Cellfrai Bllflk).
60. Th'H this question has proved more perplexing than secondary liability in general is
illustrated by the relative difficulties that courts have encountered in answering the two
questions. Prior to Cellfral Balik. every federal circuit had concluded Ihm an aiding and
abetting cause of aclion existed under § I O(b) and Rule JOb-5. Celllml BOllk, 5 I I U.S. at 192
(Stevens, 1., dissenting). Further, prior to Cell Ira! Bal/k, the federal cin.:uits and the SEC had
long recognized actions for conspiracy and 01 her forms or secondary liability as well. It!. at

*

*
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question, one must address the question presented in Stoneridge and
discussed herein: does § lOCb) require that a secondary actor actually
make a misstatement or omission in order to be held liable as a primary
violator under the Rule IOb-S implied cause of action?

II. STILL FLOUNDERING IN THE WAKE OF CENTRAL BANK ,
After Central Bank, "the lower courts and commentators struggled
to delineate the point at which a secondary actor's conduct rises to the
level of a primary violation.,,61 Some fourteen years after Central Bank
and six years after this author wrote those words,6l the lower courts and
commentators are still struggling to determine when the actions of a
secondary actor give rise to primary liability under § lOCb) and Rule
IOb-S. Further, this struggle, although not always stated in these terms,
centers upon the question set forth above. 63 The following discusses the
development of the case law following Central Ballk, first as it relates to
the initial tests proposed for determining whether a secondary actor's
actions amounted to a primary violation, and then turning to scheme
liability.

A. "Bright Line, " "Substantial Participation, " or Something Else?
After Central Bank, the courts initially focused on the proper test to
apply to determine when a secondary actor's conduct amounted to a
primary violation 6 • Courts and commentators addressing this issue have
most commonly applied one of two tests: the "bright line" test" or the

200-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Conversely, the federal circuits have had a much more
difficult time agreeing when a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level of a primary
violation. See s/Jpra note 18.

61.
62.

Chrisman, supra note 15, at 202. See, e.g., Regents, 482 F.3d at 386.
Chrisman, slIpra note 15.
63. See supra Part I.
64. Much of the following discussion is drawn and adapted from my earlier article on
secondary liability under Rule IOb-5. Chrisman, supra note 15, at 207-19.
65. See. e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 FJd 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), ecr/.
denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (l999)~ Dannenberg v. PaineWebber Inc. (In re Software Toohvorks
Inc.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); ill re Kendall Square Research Corp .. 868 F. Supp.
26,28 (D. Mass. 1994); Vosgcrichian V. Commodore Int'!, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa.
1994); ill re ZZZZ Best. 864 F. Supp. 960, 966 (C.D. Cal. 1994); De Leoo. supra Dole 1S, at
729-33; Prentice, supra note 18, al 725.
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The following discusses these two

1. The "Bright Line" Test
Many courts have interpreted Central Bank to mean that, to be a
primary violator under § lOCb) and Rule lOb-5, the secondary actor must
actually make the material misstatement or omission 67 This view
reflects the "bright line" test. 68
66. Courts and commentators have not consistently used the same nomenclature for
these tests. This Article's use of "bright line" and "substantial participation" was inspired by
the Second Circuit's discussion in Wright, 152 F.3d at 175. Further, the SEC has proposed a
third test that purports to be a compromise between the other two tests. Ho\vever, no circuit
court of appeals has yet adopted the SEC's test and therefore it is not addressed herein. The
closest call carne when a panel of the Third Circuit was apparently rcady to adopt the SEC's
test. See Stephen Poss, Klein v. Boyd: Holding Securities Lawyers Liable Under Rule JOb-5,
INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. LAW ADVISOR, May 1998, at 2. However, the court then
granted review cn banc vacating the prior decision, and the parties settled prior to the en bane
hearing. IGein v. Boyd, Nos. 97-1 143, 97-1261,1998 WL 55245 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 1998). Sec
Schanbaum, wpm note 18, at 202-05 (discussing thc co-creator test and noting that some
district court's have adopted thc tcst). Finally, the SEC test seems closer to substantial
participation than the bright line test, and would likely rise or fall with the fate of the
substantial participation test.
67. See Wright, J 52 F.3d at 175 (U[I]f Cel11ral Bank is to have any real meaning. a
defendant must actually make a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under
Section 10(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abctting, and no matter
how substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section J O(b)."
(citation omitted)). See also Lallanzio v. Deloille & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147, 153 (ld Cir.
2007) ("The starting point for analysis is [Central Ballk], which held that § 10(b) imposes
liability only on a pcrson who makes a material misstatement or omission, and. that there is
therefore no liability for aiding and abelting.")~ Overton v. Todman & Co., CPAs, P.C., 478
F.3d 479, 487 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[W]e remain true to [Central Balik's] prohibition on <liding and
abetting liability because we require th11t an accountant make its 011'11 misleading omission by
failing to correct its certified opinion."); Ziemba v. Cnscade Int'I., Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205
(11 th Cif. 2001) ("[W]e conclude that, in light of Centra! Bank. in order for the defendant to
bc primarily liable under § lOeb) and Rule IOb-5, the alleged misstatement or omission upon
which a plaintiff relied must have been publicly atlJibutable to the defendant al the lime that
the plaintiffs investment decision was made."); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720-21 (2d
Cir. 1997) ("A claim under § IO(b) must allege a defendant has made a material misstatement
or omission indicating an intent to deceive or defraud in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security."); Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1224 (lOth Cir. 1996)
("In reelltro! BalIk], the Supreme Court concluded that lOeb) prohibits only the making of a
material rnjsstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act." (internal
quotation marks omitted); S.E.C. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 708, 720 (D.
N.J. 2005) (discLissing "bright line" and "substantial participation," applying the former and
requiring "that a [violator] must actually make the material misstatement or omission");
Copland v. Grumet, 88 F. Supp. 2d 326, 332 (D. N.J. 1999) (holding that for claims based on
misrepresentations, the lllisrepresentations must be atuibutable to the defend am); Kendall
Square, 868 F. Supp. at 28 ("Only primary violators, i.c., thosc who make a material
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III re Kendall Square Research C0I7JOratioIJ Securities Litigation 69
exemplifies the use of the "bright line" test. In Kendall Square,
plaintiffs brought suit against several defendants, alleging "losses as a
result of materially misleading statements of revenues from the sale of
[Kendall Square Research Corporation's] high performance parallel
computer systems.,,70 All of the defendants settled except for Price
Waterhouse, one of the then "big five" accounting firms,71 and the
company's auditor. 72 The complaint alleged that Price Waterhouse
violated § lOeb) and Rule IOb-5 by: (1) reviewing and approving
quarterly financial reports for the company, (2) issuing an unqualified
audit opinion 73 on the company's financial statements, and (3) reviewing
and approving representations made in the company's prospectuses for
stock offerings.74
The United States District Court fo,· the District of Massachusetts
refused to dismiss the claim that Price Waterhouse could be held liable
as a primary violator of § lOeb) and Rule IOb-5 for its unqualified audit
opinion on financial statements containing material misstatements of
revenues_ 75 Although the court failed to fully explain why it refused to
dismiss the claim/6 it seems logical that if Price Waterhouse's
statements in its unqualified audit opinion suggesting that Kendall
Square's financial statements were prepared in accordance with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") turned out to be
false, then Price Waterhouse could be held liable as a primary violator,
provided the other elements of a primary violation are present. 77

misstatement or omission or commit a manipulative act, are subject to private suit under
Section lO(b)" (empbasis in original)); Vosgerichiall, 862 F. Supp. at 1378 (concluding that. §

lO(b) liability requires a manipulation, misrepresentation, or omission).
68. See Wriglll, 152 F.3d al 175.
69. 868 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mass. 1994).
70. ld. al27.
71. The "big five" accounting firms were reduced to the "big four" by the implosion of
Arthur Andersen following Enron and other securities fraud debacles.
7'2. Kendall Square, 868 F. Supp. at 27.
73. This is a type of audit opinion that basically stales that the audit was performed in
accord<Jocc with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), and that the company's
financial statements comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). It is
also known as a "clean" audit opinion. See S.E.C. v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217,

1223, 0.17 (S.D.N. Y. 1992). See gellerally American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, www.aicpa.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).

74.
75.
76.
77.

Kelldell! SqJJare, 868 F. Supp. at 26-28.
Id. at 281.
Id.
A major clement in such a case would likely be scienter.
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On the other hand. the court found Price Waterhouse immune from
liability for reviewing and approving the company's quarterly financial
reports and prospeclUses for stock offerings, and consequently dismissed
7s
that claim
In so holding. the court stated:
The Supreme Court's decision in Ce11/ra/ Ballk makes clem that the policy
undergirding it is to constrict the ambit of private actions under Section IO(b)
and to thereby reduce the number of parties implicated by that statute. Only
pril/l(//T vio/mors, i.e., th()se 1\'//0 make {/ material lIliSSlO(Clllel11 or omission or
c()l1lJ1lir

(f

1Il11l1ipliloril'e ({CI, arc sIIbject TO pril'nle SHir ullder Secrioll fO(b) . ...

The Coun 11l1es that the [compJaimJ's allegations that Price \Vaterhousc
reviewed and approved the quarterly financial statements and the Prospectuses
do not constitute the making of a material misstatement; at 1110St. the conduct
constitutes aiding and abelling and is thus not cognizable under Section lO(b).
Because Price Waterhouse did not aClUally engage in the reporting of the
financial sLalemems and ProspectLlses, but merely reviewed and approved
them, the statements are not attributable to Price Waterhouse and thus Price
79
Waterhouse cannot be founclliable for making a material rriisstatement.

Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank that Section
!O(b) "prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or
omission),,,sn the court concluded that, in order to be liable as a primary
violator, the defendant must actually make a material misstatement or
omission HI The court concluded that Price Waterhouse did not make the
misstatements contained in the financial statements and prospectuses
because those documents, and the misstatements contained therein, were
not "attributable" to Price Waterhouse. S} Accordingly, the court held
that the plaintiffs' claims based on the financial statements and
prospectuses could not go forward. ID
In Wright v. Ernsl & Young LLP,84 the plaintiffs brought suit
against Ernst & Young, another of the then "big five" accounting finns,
for an alleged primary violation of § IO(b). The violation alleged was
that Ernst & Young gave "private approval of the information contained
in a press release"S5 that was issued "with a notation that the information

78.
79.
80.

Kelldall Square, 868 F. Supp. a128.

Id. at 28 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.

177 (1994).
81. KClldalf Sql/are, S6R F. Supp. at 28.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.

84.

152 F.3d 169 (2e1 Cir. 1998), cert. dellied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999).

85.

Id. at 171.
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[was] unaudited and withont mention of [the company's] outside
auditor."s6 The Second Circuit began by reviewing the approaches taken
by several courts since the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank.s7
The court concluded that Central Bank requires that the defendant
actually make the misstatement or omission to be held liable under §
10(b) and Rule IOb_S. 88 The court determined that, of the two tests, only
the bright line test actually imposes such a requirement 89
After concluding that Central Bank mandates the use of the "bright
line" test,gO the court stated:
We therefore agree with the district court that holding Ernst & Young
primarily liable under the Act "in spite of its clearly tangential role in the
alleged fraud would effectively revive aiding and abetting liability under a
different name, and would therefore run afoul of the Supreme Court's holding
in Central Bank.,,91

Like the district court in Kendall Square, the Second Circuit held that a
secondary actor must actually malce the material misstatement or
omission in order for its conduct to rise to the level of a primary
violation. 92 In addition, the court concluded that "the misrepresentation
must be attributed to that specific actor at the time of public
dissemination"g] before that actor could be liable as a primary violator.
While attempting to answer what it means to make a misstatement
or omission, the Second Circuit left unanswered another question: how
does one determine whether the misrepresentation has been "attributed"
to the secondary actor? To say that the misstatement or omission must
be "attributed" to the secondary actor provides no more guidance than to
simply reiterate that the secondary actor must actually make the
misstatement or omission in order to be held liable. Again, like Kendall
Square, the court seems to have intuitively determined which statements
were actually made by the defendants without articulating a test by
which it arrived at its determination. 94
86.
87.

88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 174-75.
Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 152 F.3d 169,174-75 (2d Cif. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id. (quoting Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. 97 elv. 2189(SAS), 1997 WL
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1997)).
Wriglu, 152 F.3d at 175.
Id.

91.
563782,
92.
93.
94. The issue of the proper test for whether a secondary actor has made a misstatement
or omission is not the primLlfY focus of this Article. However. in Chrisman, supra note 15, at
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Other courts have applied the "bright line" test
In In re MTC
Eleclronic Technologies Shareholders Liligation,Y6 plaintiff shareholders
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
.
. '
~
New York, alleg1l10to that MTC had made nusrepresentatlOns.
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the company falsely stated in press
statements and SEC filings that the company had secured agreements to
provide cellular phone service and related equipment to customers in
98
China
When it was revealed that no such agreements existed, MTC
Electronics' stock price plummeted:'') and those shareholders injured by
the price drop sued various officers, the underwriters of the company's
stock offerings (I-IJ. Meyers), and the company's accounting firm (DBO
Dunwoody).loo
The plaintiffs alleged that I-IJ. Meyers was a primary violator of §
IO(b) and Rule lOb-S for having participated in the drafting and
dissemination of the company's November 1991 prospectus for its
public offering, and for the dissemination of a research report on the
company that contained allegedly false statements made by I-IJ.
Meyers.101 The court held that a suit could not be maintained against
I-IJ. Meyers for having participated in the drafting and dissemination of
the prospectus, but that a suit could be maintained against I-IJ. Meyers
for its allegedly false statements made in a research report that it had
disseminated. 102 Again, like the courts in Kendall Square!03 and
Wright,104 the MTC Eleclronics court determined that the secondary
~

2 J 9-22, I suggest a "reasonable investor" test. Regardless or the test, it is much more
important (0 note as a primary concern that the Second Circuit clearly concluded that a
misstatement or omission is required for primary liability.
95. See Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
11Il4 (1999); Anixtcr v. Home-Slnke Prod. Co., 77 F,3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996); Picard Chern.
Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 940 F, Supp. 1101 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Aetas Corp. v.
Tycom Foods, Inc., No 04-3305,2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 24165 (3d Cir. Nov. 9, 2005), eer!.
t/micd, 525 U.s. 1104 (1999).
96. 898 F, Supp. 974 (E.D.N. Y. 1995), v[lc(/Ied ill 1'(//'1, 993 F. Supp. 160 IE.D.N.Y.
1997).
97. Ir!. at 977.
98. Jt!. at 977-78 (noting thm the price of the stock went from $5 per share to $30 per
share after the public statements).
99. Id. at 978.
100. MTC Elecs., 898 F, Supp. at 978.
IIJ Lid. at 984.
102. hi. at 987.
103. Scc supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
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actor must actually make the misstatement or omission to be held
liable. 105
Similarly, the court ruled that a suit could be maintained against
DBO Dunwoody based on its issuance of an unqualified audit opinion. 106
Like the court in Kendall Square,107 the court in MTC Electronics
concluded that because an auditor actually makes statements in its audit
opinion, the auditor could be held liable as a primary violator if those
statements turn out to be false or misleading. IDS
In analyzing the various claims against these parties and the
confusion of the lower courts regarding what constitutes a primary
violation, the court made the following statement, which has been used
by courts 109 and commentators 110 to articulate the "bright line" test and
the reasoning behind it.
[l]f Central Balik is to have any real meaning, a defendanl must actually make
a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Seclion I O(b).
Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and lID matter
how substantial that aid may be, it is flat enough to trigger liabilitv /tllder
Seeliall !O(b).

III

.

Like the courts in Kendall Square and Wright,1I2 the court asserted that
the misstatement or omission must be made by the secondary actor for
primary liability to attach. Anything short of that is "merely aiding and
abetting." 113
In summary, the "bright-line" test is not really a test at all. Instead,
it is more of a statement: in order to be a primary violator of Rule IOb-5,
the secondOl)' actor must actually make the misstatement or omission ill
question. For example, in MTC Electronics, the court stated, "a
defendant must actually make a false or misleading statement in order to
be [a primary violator].,,114 Further, in Kendall Square, the court held
that "[o]nly primary violators, i.e., those who make a material
misstatement or omission ... are subject to private suit under Section

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

I II.
1 l2.
113.
114.

MTC Eler.,., 898 F. Supp. at 989.
Id.
See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying lext.
MTC Elecs., 898 F. Supp. at 989.
See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998).
See, e.g., Prentice, silpra note 18, at 725.
MTC Elecs., 898 F. Supp. al 987 (emphasis added).
See slIpra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
MTC Elecs., 898 F. Supp, al 987.
Id.
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lO(b).,,115 These cases demonstrate that the courts adopting the bright
line test have done so based in large part upon the understanding that
Central Ballk and the language of § IOCb) require that a secondary actor
must actually make the misstatement or omission in order to be held
primarily liable. As described below, the "substantial participation" test
and scheme liability both require the rejection of this understanding of
Central Bank and § lO(b).
2. The "Substantial Participation" Test
Following Central Bank, some courts held that in order to be a
primary violator under § IOCb) and Rule lOb-5, the secondary actor need
not actually make the material misstatement or omission Cas in the
"blight line" test), but may be held liable for participating in the fraud in
some "substantial" way.116 This became known as the "substantial
participation" test. 117
A famous case applying the "substantial participation" test is 111 re
ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation, lIS which resulted from the bankruptcy
of ZZZZ Best Co., once regarded as the nation's largest carpet cleaning
company. The company's founder and largest shareholder perpetrated a
scam to pass the company off as being extremely successful; he was
"ultimately convicted and imprisoned for fraud and embezzlement.,,119
The plaintiffs in ZZZZ Best sued, among many others, the company's
auditor, Ernst & Young. They alleged that Ernst & Young violated §
lO(b) and Rule IOb-5 by issuing a review report 120 on certain interim

115. 111 rc Kendall Square Research Corp., 868 F. Supp. 26. 28 (D. Mass. 1994).
116. See Dannenberg v. PaincWebber, Inc. (II/ re Software Toolworks, Inc.), 50 F.3d
615,628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. lIl.
1995); 111 rc U.S.A. Classic, No. 93-6667,1995 WL 363841 (S.D.N.Y. June 19. 1995); 111 re
ZU.Z Best. 864 F. Supp. 960. 971 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
117. See Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP. 152 FJd 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998).
118. 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
119. 1d. at 963.
120. A review report is a report issued on some type of financial information when less
than an audit has been performed. A review report provides less assurance than does an audit
and accompanying opinion.
For a rcviLJ)II report, the accountant must make the following statements:
The service provided-a review-was performed in accordance with the
SSARS standards established by the AICPA.
All information included in the financial statements is the representation of the
entity's management.
A review consists principally of inquiries of entity personnel and analytical
procedures applied to financial data.
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financial information released by the company, and by its involvement
in the creation, review, and issuance of some thirteen other public
statements released by the company and others. 12l These statements did
not contain any indication that Ernst & Young assisted ZZZZ Best Co.
in the creation, review, or issuance of these public statements. 122
Ernst & Young conceded that it made the review report and that it
could be liable as a primary violator provided the other elements were
met; however, Ernst & Young argued that it did not make the other
thirteen statements, and thus those statements could not lead to a primary
violation. 123 The United State District Court for the Central Distlict of
California began its analysis by noting, "in Ce/ltral Ballk, the Supreme
Court's opinion makes clear that more than simply knowing assistance
with the underlying jiYll.ldllient scheme is required for Section lOeb)
liability.,,124 However, relying on pre-Central Bank authority, the court
disagreed with Ernst & Young's positionl 25 and ruled, "anyone
intricately involved in [the] creation [of public statements such as those
at issue] ... should be held liable under Section lO(b)/Rule IOb_S."126
l27
111 re S(jftware Toolworks Inc. Securities Litigation
is another
case in which the court applied the "substantial participation" test.
Sojiware Tooiworks involved disappointed investors who brought suit
A review is substantially narrower in scope than an <ludil, the objective of
which is the expression of an opinion on financial statements taken as a whole, and
that, accordingly, no opinion is expressed.
The accountant is not aware of any material modifications that should be made
to the financial statements in order for them to be in conformity with generally

accepted accounting principles (GAAP)-other than those modification:i, if any,
indicated in his report.
D. EDWARD MARTIN, ATIORNEY'S HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FINANCIAL
REPORTING § 13.04 (2007).

121.
122.
123.

=Z Best. 864 F. Supp. at 964.
/d. at 96S.
Id.
124. Id. at 969 (emphasis added). This statement by the Ninth Circuit is wholly
contradicted by the Ninth Circuit's deeisioll ill Simpson v. AOL Time Warner IIlC., 452 F.3d
1040 (9th Cif. 2006). See infra note 153 and accompanying text. fn ZZZZ Best, the Ninth
Circuit recognized that knowing assLstance is not enough under Celltral Balik; however, under
Simpson, the Ninth Circuit imposed the principal purpose and effects test. Under both
"knowing assistance" and "plincipal purpose and effects" tests, the focus is not on the actions,
which may be innocent in and of themselves, but on the intent. In other words, secondary
actors can assist under both tests, but they cannot have the intent to defraud. The Ninth
Circuil's jurisprudence is wholly inconsistent and is not in the least persuasive.
125. Ernst & Young essentially argued for the "bright line" test. ZZZZ Best, 864 F.
Supp. at 968.
126. Id. at 970.
127. SOF.3d6IS(9thCir.1994).
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against Deloitte & Touche (another of the then "big live" accounting
firms), underwriters, and others for alleged violations of § IO(b) and
Rule IOb-S after the company's stock lost substantially all its value,l2H
The complaint alleged that the accountants were primary violators
because they reviewed a duplicitous letter to the SEC, consulted the
company about the letter, and drafted and edited another such letteL 129
Though both letters were issued by the company and not by Deloitte &
Touche, the Ninth Circuit concluded, "[tlhis ev,idence is sufiicient to
sLlstain a primary cause of action under section IO(b) and, as a result,
Cell/ral Bank does not absolve Deloitte ' ~ , ,,,]30 In a later case, in citing
and discussing its holding in Software Toolworks, the Ninth Circuit
stated, "we have held that substantial participation or intricate
involvement in the preparation of fraudulent statements is grounds for
primary liability even though that participation might not lead to the
actor's actual making of the statements,,,131
A fair statement of the "substantial participation" test is as follows:
a secondary actor who substantially participates in the production of
doculIlellis or other materials that contain misstatemel1ls or omissions
may be held liable as a primm)' violator of Rule lOb-5 evel1 though the
actor does 110t aCfllally make a misstatement or omission, This
characterization of Rule IOb-S liability is at great vmiance with the
"bright line" test, with the critical distinction being whether the
secondary actor must actually make a misstatement or omission to be
held liable, Nevertheless, this statement of the rule consistently requires
that someone must make a misstatement or omission; the only question
left is who made it'? Or, more specifically, who is liable for making it?
The "substantial participation test" presumes that someone macle a
misstatement but imputes the misstatement of the primary actor to the
secondary actoL Partly building upon this foundation, scheme liability

128, ld, at 620,
129, ld, at 627-29,
130, ld, at 628 n,3,
131, Howard v, Everex Sys" 228 F,3d 1057,1061 n,5 (9th Cir. 2000), Other cases have
also concluded that substantial participation constitutes a primary violation. In Cas/mum 1'.
Coopers & Lybralld, the United Smtes District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
Ihat Coopers & Lybrand (another of the then "big-five") could be liable under § lO(b) and
Rule lOb-S for "play[ing] a central role in the drafting and formation of the alleged
misstatements," Cashman v, Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F, Supp, 425, 432 (N,D, IlL 1995),
Further, in Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., the District COllrt for the Southcm District of

New York held that the underwriter could be liable for "actively participat[ingl in rormulating
the language of the prospectus ... even though the prospectus was published in the name of
Ihe issuer," 933 F, Supp, 303, 316 (S,D.N,Y, 1996), aff'd, 108 F,3d 1370 (2nd Cir. 1997),
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purports that a secondary actor can be a primary violator under Rule
10b-S(a) and (c) without making a misstatement or omission, because
these subsections by their words do not require a misstatement or
onUSSlOn.

B. The Rise (and Fall?) of Scheme Liability
As the preceding demonstrates, the real issue underlying the circuit
split on the liability of secondary actors is a disagreement as to whether
Central Bank and § 10(b) require that a defendant actually make a
misstatement or omission, or whether it is sufficient merely that some
party, somewhere, makes a misstatement or omission. A new argument
forwarded by the plaintiffs' bar brought this issue to a head. Following
in the vein of the substantial participation test, some plaintiffs, unhappy
with judgments against insolvent primary actors, began arguing that a
secondary actor who had not made a misstatement or omission should be
liable as a primary violator pursuant to Rule lOb-Sea) and (c) for
participation in a "scheme to defraud" (referred to as "scheme liability").
These plaintiffs agree that Rule 10b-S(b) requires a misstatement or
omission, but argue that subsections (a) and (c) do not. Therefore, they
argue that a defendant's participation or assistance in the preparation of
the misstatement is not required (as under substantial participation) but
that only participation in a scheme to defraud should be sufficient to
establish liability. The following first discusses scheme liability as it
developed in three opinions in the circuit courts of appeals, and then
discusses the Supreme Court's attempt to resolve the issue in Stoneridge.

1. Scizeme Liability in the Circuit Courts of Appeals
Like "bright line" and "substantial participation," scheme liability
split the circuits. 132 The Ninth Circuit endorsed scheme liability and
even propounded a test to determine when a secondary actor may be
liable thereunder. 133 • On the other hand, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
rejected scheme liability, branding it, like the substantial participation
test, nothing more than aiding and abetting by another name. 1)4 Again,
132.

See

slIpra note 18 and accompanying text for sources supporting a split in the

circuits.

133. See supra note 18 for sources, including the test propounded by the Ninth Circuit.
134. hz re Charter Communications, Inc., 443 F.3d 987 (8th eir. 2006) (rejecting a claim
of scheme liability); Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston
(USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim of scheme liability). See also
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as the following demonstrates, the critical issue in these cases is whether
§ IO(b) requires that a secondary actor actually make a misstatement or
omission in order to be held liable as a primary violator of § IOCb) and
Rule IOb-5.
In In re Charter Communications, Inc., Securities Litigatiol1,135 the
initial circuit court case addressing scheme liability, the plaintiffs
essentially alleged that Charter, "one of the nation's largest cable
television providers," engaged in various fraudulent activities designed
to inflate its financial statements. 136 However, while the plaintiffs
named several defendants, including Charter, Charter executives, and
Arthur Andersen, LLP (Charter's auditor), the opinion centered upon the
liability of "two equipment vendors, Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., and
Motorola, Inc. (collectively, 'the Vendors,).,,13? The plaintiffs alleged
that the Vendors violated § lO(b) and Rule IOb-5 by engaging in a
scheme to defraud whereby they "enter[ed] into sham transactions with
[Charter] that improperly inflated Charter's reported operating revenues
and cash flOW."138
In describing the alleged scheme, the Eighth Circuit stated:
At the time in question, Charter delivered cable services through set-top
boxes installed on customers' TV sets. Charter purchased the set-top boxes
from third-parties, including the Vendors. In August 2000, although Charter
had firm contracts with the Vendors to purchase set-top boxes at a set price
sufficient for its present needs, Charter agreed to pay the Vendors an additional
$20 per set-top box in exchange for the Vendors returning the additional
payments to Charter in the form of advertising fees.
Plaintiffs alleged that these were sham or wash transactions with no
economic substance, contrived to inflate Charter's operating cash flow by
some $ I 7,000,000 in the fourth quarter of 2000 in order to meet the revenue
and operating cash flow expectations of Wall Street analysts.
Chat1er
accomplished the deception with fraudulent accounting by improperly
capitalizing the increased equipment expenses while treating the returned
advel1ising fees as immediate revenue. Plaintiffs alleged that the Vendors
entered into these sham transactions knowing that Chmter intended to account
ror them improperly and that analysts would rely on the inflated revenues and
operating cash flow in making stock recommendations. Plaintiffs did not
allege that the Vendors played any role in preparing or disseminating the

Taylor, SlIpra note 35, 385 (arguing that the lower courts' acceptance of either the substalllial
participation test or scheme liability as illustrdted by the EnrOll court would have the same
effect as reinstating aider and <lbeuor liability in suits by private plaintiffs).
135. 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006).
136. 1<1. at 989.
137. lel.
138. Id.
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fraudulent financial statements and press releases through which Charter

published its deception to analysts and investors.

139

The plaintiffs alleged that the Vendors were primary violators of "Rule
lOb-Sea) and (e) by participating in a 'scheme or artifice to defraud' and
by engaging in a 'course of business which operates ... as a fraud or
deceit."""" Many courts and commentators call this theory "scheme
liability." "Ii
The plaintiffs' argument in favor of scheme liability emphasizes the
difference between the wording of Rule IOb-S(b), which pbinly requires
a misstatement, and subsections (a) and (c), which are much broader and
do not plainly require a misstatement or omission.'''' Further, the court
noted that the plaintiff's theory of scheme liabi lity "depends on the
assertion that Celltrai Bank's analysis did not affect the scope of primary
liability under subparts (a) and (e).,,'''3
In rejecting these arguments and scheme liability, the court stated:
We conclude that Ce11lral Ballk and the earlier cases on which it relied stand
for three goveming principles: (1) The Court's categorical declaration that a
private plaintiff "may not bring a IOb-5 suit against a Jefendant for acts not
prohibiled by lhe lexl of 10(b)" included claims under Rule IOb-5(a) and (c),
as well as Rule lOb-5(b). (2) A device or contrivance is not "deceptive,"
within the meaning of R lOeb), ilbsent some misstatement Or a failure to
disclose by one who h::1S a duty to disclose. (3) The term "manipulative" in
lOeb) has the limited contextual meaning ascribed in Sail fa Fe. Thus, al1Y
defenda1lt wltu does /l0( make or affirmatively calise to be IIIwle u ji-alldLlle11l
misstatement or omissiolJ, or who does flot directly engage in II/w1//JIlI(Jtil'e
secllrities lradifl~, IJractices, is ulmost guilt". all/hling
llnd144
ubetfillr:
ulld callnot
.
'be held liable ullder § lO(b) or any sl/bpart of Rille lOb-5.

*

*

The court concluded that accepting scheme liability would violate
Central Bank and related authority by allowing secondary actors to be
held liable without their making a misstatement or omission, and would
therefore be an unwarranted extension of securities fraud liability.,,15
139.
140.

Charter, 443 F.3d at 989-YIl.
Id. at 991.
141. See Beattie. supra note 35 (dubbing "scheme liability" the "new risk on the
lsecurities law] horizon").
142.
Clwrrer, ~143 E3d at 991.
143. It!. (stating that the argulllent relics primarily upon "a recent district court decision,"
III rc PL7rJ1w/at, 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 492-503 (S.D.N.Y.1005».
144. It!. at 991 (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 991-93. The court found there to be no cases so extending lhe reach of \(Hb)
and rule 10b-5 to include "a business lhat entered into an arm's length non-securities

*
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Further, the court noted that any decision so extending liability "should
be made by Congress.,,146
l47
Just two and a half months after Charter, the Ninth Circuit issued
its opinion in Simpson v. AOL T;me Warner IIlC. 148 The facts of Simpson
are virtually indistinguishable from those in Charler I49 In Simpson, the
plaintiffs alleged that AOL Time Warner, Inc. and certain other outside
parties and vendors (refelTed to herein collectively as "AOL") engaged
in a scheme to defraud in violation of §. lO(b) and Rule IOb-S by
engaging in certain "round-trip transactions" that had no economic
purpose other than to inflate the revenues of an Internet company,
Homestore.com. 150 Despite virtually identical facts, lSI the Ninth Circuit

transaction with an entity that then used the transaction to publish false and misleading
statements." frl. at 992. Further, the court stated that such an extension would "introduce
potentially far~reaching duties and uncertainties
those engaged in day-ta-day business

ror

dealings." Charler,443 FJd at 993. Indeed, it would seem to extend liability to or perhaps
even beyond its reach in the heyday of aiding and abeuing liability. As one commentator
stated, hopefully "scheme liability is likely to either overlap or supersede the coverage of
fr,lUdulcnt statement liability under Rule IOb-5(b)." Schanbaulll, supra note 18, at 236.
146. Charter, 443 F.3d at 993; see also Joseph A. Grundfest, Scheme Lillbility: A
Questioll/or C011gress, Not the COllrts (Stnnford Law and Econ. Olin \Vorking Paper No. 344,
2(07), available at hltp:llssrn.com/abstract:::j 005524 (although an ardent opponent of
judicially created "scheme liability," respondents in Stoneridge retained Professor Grundfest
to provide counsel in connection with that case).
147. The Ninth Circuit Coun of Appeals has the dubious honor of being the circuit court
most often overruled by the Supreme Court. See Grundfcst, slIpra note 146, at 5 (citing The
Supreme COllrt, 2005 Term-The Statistics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 372, 381 (2006) (indicating
that the Supreme Court reversed or vacated the Ninth Circuit in fifteen out of eighteen cases

during the 2005 lerm)).
148. 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006).
149.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Buston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d

372,386 n.24, 392 (51h Cir. 2007). ccrl. dCllied, 128 S. Cl. 1120 (2008). In an efforl 10
distinguish its holding in Simpson from Charter, the Ninth Circuit cites Clwrrer only once,
stating that the primary factual difference is that Charter involved legitimate, amls-Icngth
transactions whereas Simpson did not. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040,
1050 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court noted in its grant of certiorari, however, [hat the
transactions in Charter involved "no legitimate business or economic purpose." Further, the
plaintiffs in Charter described the transactions as shams with "no economic substance" other
than inflating Chaner's financial statements. Charter,443 F.3d at 989-90. Accordingly, [he
Ninth Circuit's uttempt to distinguish Charter and thereby reconcile it with Simpson are
wholly unpersuasive because the situations are essentially identical. See Regeflfs, 482 F.3d at
392. The Supreme Court in Stoneridge noted that the U[d]ccisions of the Courts of Appeals
are in connict" with regard to scheme liability. Stoneridge Tnv. Partners, LLC v. Scielllilic-

Allanta, Inc" 128 S. Ci. 761, 767 (2008).
150. Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1042-43.
151. In both cases, outside vendors entered into transactions with no business or
economic purpose other than to aid the primary actor in overstating its financial condition,
with no public misstatements by the vendor and no duty to disclose.
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reached the polar opposite conclusion, holding that the plaintiffs could
recover in such situations upon proper pleading under the theory of
scheme liability pursuant to Rule IOb-5(a) and (C).152
The Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that liability under Rule IOb-5
requires a misstatement or omission. Relying upon its formulation of
the substantial participation test, the court stated, "[ wlith respect to the
making of false statements or omissions, we have held that 'substantial
participation or intricate involvement in the preparation of fraudulent
statements is grounds for primary liability even though that participation
might not lead to the actor's actual making of the statements.',,15,
Further, in response to the defendants' argument "that imposing liability
for participation in an overall scheme to defraud would impose liability
for conduct other than the making of a material misstatement or
omission and would conflict with Central Ballk[,]" the court merely
responds, "[wle disagree.,,15' While not entirely clear from the court's
opinion, it appears that the court disagrees with the assertion that Central
Ballk stands for the premise that 10b-5 requires a misstatement or
omiSSIOn. This is not surprising and is entirely consistent with the
court's understanding of Central Ballk that has previously led to its
adoption of the "substantial participation" test.
The Ninth Circuit appears to rely again on the "substantial
participation" test when it states, "[wle see no justification to limit
liability under § lOeb) to only those who draft or edit the statements
released to the public.,,155 This assertion seems to fly in the face of
Celltral Bank, a Supreme Court opinion, and, therefore, purportedly
binding on the Ninth Circuit, which other courts had determined lVould
require thaI the d~felldallts actually make the misstatements or omission,
not just "draft or edit" them. 156 Seeming to switch arguments in midstream, the Ninth Circuit cites Professor Prentice for the proposition that
a defendant might be liable for the misstatements of another based npon
the phrase "directly or indirectly" found in § lOeb) and Rule IOb_5. 157
152.
SimpsolI, 45:2 FJd at 1042~43, 1047-55. In Simpsoll, however, the Court found that
the plainli IT's cornplai nt did not .sufficiently allege scheme liability, and the Court affirmed the
lower court opinion and remanded for further proceedings, presumably giving the plaintiffs
the opportunity to amend their complaint in accordance with the Court's opinion. let. at 1043,
1055.
153. ld. at 1048 (quoting fiOlv(lrd v. Everex Sys" Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 0.5 (9th Cir.
2000»).
154. Id. al 1049.
155. Simpsoll. 452 F.3d a11049.
156. See slIpra Part ILA.
157.
SimpsolI, 452 F.3d at 1049 (citing and quoling Prentice, supra note 18. at 731).
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However, the Supreme Court already rejected a similar argument for
aiding and abetting made by the plaintiffs in Celltral Ballk, ISH As a
result of this rather tortured reasoning, the court held that a secondary
actor may be a primary violator "for participation in a 'scheme to
defraud'" so long as the secondary actor "engaged in conduct that had
the principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact in
furtherance of the scheme [to defraud],,:l59
Further, scheme liability and its "principal purpose and effect test"
is arguably just another fo-rm of secondary liability. Much like
substantial participation, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy, scheme
liability focuses on the actions and intent of the secondary actor rather
than on whether the secondary actor has engaged in conduct upon which
a plaintiff could presumptively or actually rely. Under all four theories
of liability, some combination of act and scienter is required, but those
acts need not be communicated to the market or the individual plaintiffs.
For substantial participation, the secondary actor must substantially
participate in the production of documents that contain a misstatement or
..
d 160 F or a]'d'mg an dab
'
omISSIOn
th at operates as a f rau.
ettmg,
th e
plaintiff must prove "(I) a primary violation of § I O(b), (2) recklessness
[or knowledge of the existence of a primary violation], and (3)
substantial assistance given to the primary violator by the aider and
abettor.,,161 "Accordingly, the distinction between aiding and abetting
and the 'substantial participation' test hinges on the difference between
'substantial assistance' and 'substantial participation,,,,161 a distinction
that is markedly without a difference. Conspiracy is nothing more than a
combination of two or more individuals to commit an unlawful act. 163
This form of secondary liability imputes liability to secondary actors not
for their actions, but for the actions of others. 164 And lastly, for scheme
liability to apply, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant committed

158. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 51] U.S. 164, 17577 (1994). The Supreme Court responded to u similar argument there in part by noting that
the person must still be engaged in one of the proscribed activities in order to be held liable.
Accordingly, the argument made by the Nimh Circuit would seem to fail ns well because one
must nctually make a misstatement or omission to be held iinble as a primary violator.
159. Simpson, 452 E3d at 1048 (emphasis added).
160. See sIIpra note 131 and accompanying text.
161. Celllral Bank, 511 U.S. at 168 (citing First Interstate Bank or Denver, N.A. v. Pring,
969 F.ld 891,898-903 (10th Cir. 1992)).
162. Chrisman, supra note 15, at 216.
163. q: IS U.S.C.A. § 37] (West 2007).
164. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (propounding a new rule that the
act of one is the act of all).
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an act, which may be innocent in and of itself, but which had the
principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact and
thereby furthering a scheme to defraud. While the courts applying the
"substantial participation" test and scheme liability purport to be using
these theories to determine whether a secondary actor is a primary
violator, in actuality these theories are both nothing more than secondary
liability by a different name.
In its rejection of secondary liability absent congressional action,165
the Supreme Court necessarily rejected aiding and abetting and
conspiracy liability in Central Bonk. 166 This holding of Celltral Bonk
was left undisturbed and perhaps even reinforced by the Court's holding
in Stoneridge. Further, scheme liability, as it was argued by the
plaintiffs in Stoncridge and Simpson, is essentially identical to the
"substantial participation" test, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy in
many ways. 167 For example, all four theories do not require a

165. Cellfl"a/ BClIlk, 511 U.S. at 184 ("The fact that Congress chose to impose some forms
of secondary liability, but not others, indicates a deliberate congressional choice with which
the courts should not interfere. ").
166. Cellll"a/ Blink, 511 U.S. at 184, 190-91. See also Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenofr,
Plcsent, Sheinf'eld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837, 843 (2d Cir. 1998); Decker v. Glenfed, Inc. (Ill re
Glenfed, Inc.), 60 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1995); Kidder Peabody & Co. v. Unigestion Int'I
Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 479, 496-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Van de VeIde v. Coopers & Lybrand, 899 F.
Supp. 731, 738 (D. Mass. 1995); Upton v. McKerrow, 887 F. Stipp. 1573, 1580 (N.D. Ga.
1995); III rc Syntex Cnrp., 855 F. Stipp. 1086, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Bill cf Cooper v.
Pickell, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997).
167. The petitioners in SlOllcridge essentially argued for the Court to apply the "principal
purpose and effect" test in order to determine scheme liability. They also argued that
recklessness could be an nppropriate level of scienter for scheme liability. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 17-18.24, Stoneridge rnv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Cl. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43).
JUSTICE ALITa: Then I see absolutely no difference between your test and
the elements of aiding and abetting.
MR. GROSSMAN: The difference is conceptual.
JUSTICE ALITa: Because you said it's not necessary for there to be an actual
decepti ve act on the part of the Respondents.
MR. GROSSMAN: There has to be a deception-there is deception. The
deception is you're entering into an advertising contract that presents the illusion
that you were purchasing advertising, when in ract you were not purchasing
advertising.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But that's-but that's not the fraud that was
imposed upon the market. The fraud imposed L1pon the market was Charter's
accounting for the transnclion on its books. Nobody bought or sold stocks in the
reliance lipan the way that Scientil"ic-Atlallla and Charter structured their deal.
They did so in reliance upon the way Charter communicated its accounting to the
market.place.
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misstatement or omission by the secondary actor, all four theories would
find reliance upon the misstatements or omissions of another as
satisfying the reliance requirement, and all four theories would impose
liability on the secondary actor even in instances where the secondary
actor has not satisfied all of the requirements for a primary violation as
articulated by the Supreme Court. Therefore, it is fair to characterize all
four as theories of secondary liability, and to presume that they have no
continuing viability after Stone ridge,
The Ninth Circuit -closes in Simpson by examining a couple of the
elements of the Rule lOb-S cause of action in light of its holding with
regard to scheme liability _168 With regard to the reliance requirement,
the court reasons that there should be a presumption in favor of reliance
in a scheme liability case_
We may presume, absent persuasive conflicting evidence, that purchasers
relied on misstatements produced by a defendant as part of a scheme to

MR. GROSSMAN: There was no way-no way that that could properly be
accounted for, and the Respondents understood that. And lhal' s why they did what
they did, that' 5 what -

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I agree with Justice Scalia's earlier comment, I
don't think that Scientific-Atlanta or Motorola really cared anything of--one way
or the other about the investors. For them the scheme made a certain amount of

sense, they didn't really care.
MR. GROSSMAN: They may not have cared, but that would be reckless
because they certainly understoodJUSTICE KENNEDY: Bul Il1al's rar dilTerenl rrom l1aving a purpose_ You
said they have to have a purpose.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Is it fair 10 say that all aiders and abeltors who commit
deceptive acts arc principals?
MR_ GROSSMAN: No_
JUSTICE SCALIA: What's [he difference? What separates the two?
MR. GROSSMAN: You have to take it the next step further, \vhcthcr or not
that deceptive act had the purpose und effect for furthering a scheme of an investor.
MR. GROSSMAN: lfyou fucilitate with a deceptive acl, then you're a primary
violator. That's what Section lO(b) prohibits. If you facilitate without a deceptive
act, then you arc an aider and abetter [sic].
ft!. at 17-18, 22-24 Requiring a deceptive act and reducing the level of scienter to
recklessness Ilwkes schcme liability virtually identical to aiding and abelting liability that was
expressly rejected in Central Bank. See slIpm note 166. Further, even raising the scienter
requirement to actual knowledge would provide little help and lead inexorably to non-valueadding activity such as representutions and wilrralllies regarding accounting treatmcnt in
virlUally every vendor contracl with a publicly-traded company. S!oneridge, 11.8 S. CL at
772.
168. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040. 1052 (9111 Cir. 2006)_
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defraud, even if the delcndanl did not publish or release the misrepresentations
directly to the securities market.
We conclude that conduct by a defendant that had the principal purpose
(Ind ejfecl of creating a false appearance in deceptive transactions as part of a
scheme to defraud is conduct that uses or employs a deceptive device within
the meaning of § IO(b) .... [Further], a plaintiff may be presumed to have
relied on this scheme to defraud if a misrepresentation,. which necessarily
resulted from the scheme and the defendant's conduct therein, was

.
d IOta
.
.
n
. [69
d ·ISSemll1ate
an CfI-IClcnt
mar k
'ct aneI
was
re ectc d'111 t he mar k'ct pncc.

It appears that in Stone ridge the Supreme Court rejected this formulation
of reliance, which seems contrary to Central Bank as well. t70 The
Supreme Court in Central Bank stated that the application of the reliance
requirement supports the holding that a secondary actor cannot be liable
for aiding anel abetting. [7[ "Were we to allow the aiding and abetting
action proposed in this case, the defendant could be liable without any
showing that the plaintiff relied upon the aider and abettor's statements
or actions." tn Thus, pursuant to aider and abettor liability, a secondary
actor could be held liable via reliance on someone else's misstatement
merely because the secondary actor gave "substantial assistance" to the
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. The Stollcridge dissent, as well as some commentators, have interpreted the
Supreme Court's majority opinion in Stolleridge as adopting a standard similar to Simpson's
efficient market presumption of reliance established in Basic, fnc. v. Lel'insoll, 485 U.S. 224
(1988). Specifically. the dissent in StoIJeridge interprets the majority's opinion to require the
secondary actors deceptive conduct make the primary actors disclosure to the public
"necessary or inevitable." Stollcridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, 1. dissenting). The
Supreme Court leaves this question of reliance unanswered. Does this necessary and
inevitable standard create another presumption of reliance? Is that presumption of reliance
inherently unobtainable? See Evan A. Davis, Mitchell A. Lowenthal, & Nancy L Ruskin, Oil
SroTleritige fllvestlllel1t Parmers, LLC \I. Scielltific At/al/w, filL, LEXISNEXIS EXPERT
COM1\'lENTARIES (Feb. S, 2008).
Perkins Coie, A/wtller Blow to Secllrities-Litigalion
PlailJl(ft:~:
The
Supre/JIe
COllrt
Kllocks
Dowll
Scheme
Liahilhy,
http://www.perkinscoic.com/news/pubs_detail.aspx?op=updates&pub [ication= 1585 (Jan. 17,
2008) ("This 'necessary and inevitable' standard provides significant protection to entities
who engage in transactions with parties who subsequently choose to misrepresent those
transactions. It is unlikely that such misrepresenl<llions will be found to be the 'necessary and
inevitable' results of the transactions themselves."). Or is reliance only premised on (1) actual
reliance, (2) presumed reliance under Basic I'. Lel'illson, or (3) presumed reliance under
Alfl/illted Ute and the Supreme Courts usc of "necessary and inevitable" just hyperbole? See
Basic, fIlC., 485 U.S. 224; Afliliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972). These questions are pivotal to a complete undcrstanding of reliance; however, they
arc beyond the scope of this Article. Further, they demonstrate why a ruling that deceptive
conduct requires a misstatement or omission would have provided a great deal more clarity
than the ruling in SlOllcridge.
171. Ceil/raJ Ballk, 511 U.S. at 180.
172. Id.
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primary violator-a result the Supreme Coun in Cenlral Bank found
untenable. Similarly, scheme liability, as here articulated, would permit
a defendant to be held liable via reliance on someone else's
misstatements or omissions merely because the secondary actor in some
way participated in a scheme to defraud-a result that appears contrary
to the Supreme Court's opinion in Sloneridge. 173
The Ninth Circuit's formulation of scheme liability, much like its
formulation of the substantial participation test, seems to be nothing
more than aiding and abetting by another name.174 The Fifth Circuit
reached this conclusion in Regellls of Ihe Universil), of California v.
Credil Suisse First BasIOn (USA), Il1c.,175 a case arising from the Enron
debacle and reported only months after Charier and Simpson. In
Regen/s, the plaintiffs sought a class certification claiming that Enron
and the defendant banks engaged in various fraudulent activities, such as
the "Nigerian Barges Transaction," that allowed Enron to overstate its
revenues and innate its financial statements. "0
The plaintiffs
characterized these transactions as "irrational," and alleged that the
defendant banks were liable for their involvement in these transactions
under a theory of scheme liability.177 The plaintiffs, however, did not
allege that the defendant made any public misrepresentations or had any
duty to disclose information that the plaintiffs would consider material in
· ·Jl1vestment deClSlons.
..
178
mak'lIlg
In finding for the defendants, the Fifth Circuit noted, "[t]he district
court's conception of 'deceptive act' liability [which follows Simpson] is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision that § lOeb) does not
give rise to aiding and abetting liability.,,17'} The court continued:

*

An act cannot be deceptive within the meaning of lO(b) where the actor has
Imade no misstatement or has] no duty 10 disclose. Presuming plaintiff~<;'

Sfoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
See, e.g., In re Cl1arter Commc'ns, Inc., 443 E3d 987 (8th Cir. 2(06); III re MTC
Elees. Tech. S'holders Litig., X98 F. Supp. 974, 9X5 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vllcated ill part 011
recollsiderarioll by, 993 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.N. Y. 1997).
175. 482 F.3d 371 (Sill Cir. 2007).
176. Jr!. at 377. The "Nigerian Barges Transi.lction" was a complex transaction wherein
the defendant banks purchased asscts-"clcctricity-generating harges off the coast of
Nigcria"-rrom Enron, based on Enroll's sccrel guarantee 10 repurchase the barges after it met
upcoming stock analysts' estimates. Id. The secret agreement allowed EnrOll to "book[J the
transactions as a sale and accordingly listll the revenue therefrom in its year-end financial
statement." It/.
177. RegellTs, 482 FJd at 377~n.
178. Id. al 38S.
179. Id. al 386.
173.

174.
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allegations to be true, Enron committed fraud by misstating its accounts, but
the banks only aided an [sic) abetted that fraud by engaging in transactions to
make it more plausible: they owed no duty to Enron's shareholders. tSO

Following the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in C/wrter, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that § I O(b) prohibits only two types of conduct:
manipulation and deception. 1'1 The court gave short shrift to any claim
that defendant's conduct might involve manipulation. 182 In doing so, the
court adopted the Supreme Court's narrow definition of manipulative
conduct in the context of securities law. I'3 In essence, because the
defendants did not "act directly in the market for the relevant security[,]"
the complained of conduct could not constitute manipulation. 184
The Regents opinion focused more closely on the meaning of
"deceptive act" On this point, the lower court adopted a broad
definition, concluding that a "deceptive act ... includes participating in
a transaction whose principal purpose and effect is to create a false
appearance of revenues,,18'-essentially scheme liability. Further, the
district court found that participation in a "scheme to defraud" by
individual "deceptive acts" gives rise to joint and several liability for the
entire scheme. 186 The Fifth Circuit responded, "[a]lbeit with the best of
intentions and after Herculean effort, the district court atTives at an
elToneous understanding of securities law .... ,,187
In a wholesale rejection of the district court's broad understanding
of "deceptive act," the Fifth Circuit concluded that '''deception' within
the meaning of § I O(b) requires that a defendant fail to satisfy a duty to
disclose material information to a plaintiff' or make a material
misrepresentation upon which the plaintiff may reasonably rely.18S As
mentioned above, the plaintiff alleged neither misrepresentations nor
omissions by the defendants. 189
The court, however, assumed
180. [d.
181. Regell/s, 482 F.3d at 388.
182. Id. at 390.
183. The Fifth Circuit nOles, however, that the Supreme Court has yet to give an
exhaustive list of manipulative conduct. On this point, the Fifth Circuit cites to then-District
Judge Higgenbotham's opinion in /-Illllda/z{ I'. United Benefit Life Ills. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349,
1360 (N.D. Tex. 1979), describing his analysis of the meaning of J1lanipulation as
"exhaustive" and "influential."
184. Regell/s, 482 F.3d at 390.
185. Id. at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 380.
188. Rege"'s. 482 F.3d at 384.
189. Id. at 386.
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"arguendo that plaintiffs' case primarily concern[edl improper
..
,,190 TIle court th
'
. between
omISSIOns.
en recogmzed
the close connectIOn
the requirement of a misstatement or omission and the essential element
of reasonable reliance under § IOb. 191 The court held, "[wlithout its
broad conception of liability for deceptive acts, the district court could
not have found [reliancel.,,192 Underlying the court's conclusion is the
fact that it would be unreasonable for an investor to rely on disclosure
from a party owing no duty to make such disclosures. 193 Therefore, the
'court held, "lilf the banks' actions were non-pUblic, immaterial, or not'
misrepresentative because the market had no right to rely on them (in
other words the banks owed no duty), the banks should be able to
[escape liability in a private actionj.,,194
In summary, the circuit courts first considered whether the "bright
line" or the "substantial participation" test should be used to determine
whether a secondary actor's conduct lises to the level of a primary
violation under § lOeb) and Rule IOb-5 following Central Bank. They
split on that issue. Then, the circuits considered the issue of scheme
liability, and they split on that issue as well. In addressing both of these
issues, the circuits actually split over the question of whether § lOeb)
requires that a secondary actor actually make a misstatement or omission
in order to be held liable as a primary violator under the Rule IOb-5
implied cause of action. In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to do more than decide the merits of scheme liability by
ruling on this more fundamental question.
190.
191.

Id. at 384.
!d. at 385 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,

N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994) for the proposition thilt aiding and abetting would allow
plaintiffs to "circumvent (he reliance requirement" of the private cause of aClion under §
!O(b)).
192. Rege1Zls, 482 F.3d at 382. Although the Regcllts decision takes place in the context

of a c1uss certification dispute, the principles recognized by the court in reaching its
conclusion apply with cqual force in situations involving individual plaintiffs. As the court of
appeals noted, the district coun's certification of the class rested on "erroneous presumptions
of reliance." ]d. at 383. Reliance is both illl clement of the class certification and an essential
element of the § IO(b) private cause of action. Just as the class of plaintiffS in Regellls would
not be entitled to r~ly on the fraud-on-the-market theory to prove reliance, neither would an
individual plaintiff. An individual plaintiff would have to prove they reasonably and
justifiably relied on the bunk's duty to disclose information material to the plaintiWs
investment decision-an unlikely event absent some special relationship between one of the
defendant banks and an Enron shareholder.
193. Id. at 385 ("Here, however, where the plaintiffs had no expectation that the banks
would provide them with information, there is no reason to expect that the plaintiffs were
relying on their candoL").
194.

/d. at 383.
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2. Stoneridge alld the Fall of Scheme Liability?

The opinions in Charter, Simpson, and Regents were all appealed to
the Supreme Court. 195 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Charter,
the first of the three chronologically, under the name Stoneridge
Investl71e11l Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and delayed ruling
on the petitions for certiorari in the other two until after its opinion in
Stoneridge.
Justice Kennedy,l96 writing for the Court in Stolleridge, adopted the
facts as alleged by the petitioner. 197 After quoting § lOeb) and Rule lObS, Justice Kennedy writes, "[t]hough the text of ... [§ lO(b)] does not
provide for a private cause of action for § I O(b) violations, the Court has
found a right of action implied in the words of the statute and its
implementing regulation."I98 Listing the elements of "a typical § 10(b)
private action,,,199 Justice Kennedy writes:
a plaintiff must prove (I) a material misrepresentation or omission by the
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale or a security; (4) reliance upon the
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation?OO

After setting forth the elements, the Court notes that Central Bank
abolished aiding and abetting liability as beyond the reach of the
statute.-'01 Further, Congress was asked to overturn Central Ballk but
chose to provide only the SEC with the power to pursue secondary
actors for aiding and abetting in the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act. 202 Therefore, the Court concludes that "[t]he conduct of a
secondary actor must satisfy each of the elements or preconditions for
195,

See In re Charter Commc'ns Inc., 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. grallfed slIb
Stoncridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1873 (2007);
Regents, 482 F.3d 372, cert. denied, 128 S. CL 1120 (2008); Simpson v. AOL Time Warner
Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), cat. grallted sLlb 110111., Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. CaL
State Tcachers' Retirement Sys., 128 S. Cl. 1119 (2008).
196. Justice Kennedy also wrote the opinion for the Court in Cent. Balik of Deliver, N.A.
\'. First inlersUite Balik afDenver, NA.
197. SWllcridge, 128 S. CL at 766. The facts as stated by Justice Kennedy are nearly
identical to the facts stated by the Eighth Circuit and discussed SlIpra at notes 133-138 and
accompanying text. Therefore, those facts are not restated here.
198. Id. at 768 (citing Superintendent of Ins. or N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 13n.9(1971)).
199. ld. (citing Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Brouda. 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005)).
200. ld.
20!. SlOlIeridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768.
202. ld. at 768-69.
nOIll.,
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liability" to attach?13 In other words, in order to be held liable under §
lO(b) and Rule lOb-5, a secondary actor must be a primary violator
satisfying all of the elements of a § 1O(b) private cause of action.
The Court begins its analysis of whether these elements are
satisfied in Stone ridge by addressing the first element-"a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant.,,204 In addressing the
misrepresentation or omission requirement, the Eighth Circuit in Charter
had stated that "any defendant who does not make or affinnatively cause
to be' made a fraudulent misstatement or omission ... is at most guilty of
aiding and abetting and cannot be held liable under § lO(b) or any
subpart of Rule lOb_5.,,20S Of this statement by the Eighth Circuit,
Justice Kennedy opines:
If this conclusion were read to suggC.SL there must be a specific oral or
written statement before there could be liability under § 10(11) or Rule IOb-5, it
would be erroneous. Conduct itself can be deceptive, as respondents concede.
In this case, moreover, respondents' course of conduct included both oral and
written statements, such as the backdated contracts agreed to by Charter and
respondents.

A different interpretation of the holding rrom the Court of Appeals opinion
is that the court was slating only that any deceptive statement or act
respondents made was not actionable because it did nol have the requisite
proximate relation to the investors' harm. That conclusion is consistent with
our own determination that respondents' acts or statements were not relied
upon by the investors and that, as a result, liability cannot be imposed upon
206
respondents.

Based upon the preceding statement, it appears that the Court
determined (1) that a misstatement (or omission by one with a duty to
disclose) is not required for "liability under § lO(b) or Rule lOb-5"
because "[c]onduct itself can be deceptive," and (2) that the conduct
engaged in by the respondents, "include[ing] both oral and written
statements, such as the backdated contracts agreed to by Charter and

203.
204.

Id. at 769.
Id.

205. III re Charler Commc'ns Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th eif. 2006). Interestingly, none
of the parties before the COlin in SlOlleridgc aCluillly argued that a defendant must make a
misstatement or omission in order to satisfy the first element or the § 10(b) and Rule IOb-5
cause of action. However, that clearly seems to be the plain meaning of the statement made
by the Eighth Circuit. Further, to arrive at [his conclusion, the Eight Circuit cited and
discussed, among other authorities, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Cent. BOllk of
Deliver, N.A. v. First Interstate Ballk. oj Denver, N.A.
206. Stol1eridge, 128 S. Ct. al 769.
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. 707
respondents" Wa5 deceptlve.Accordingly, based solely upon this
reasoning, a better statement of the first element would be a
misstatemellt, omission by one with a dUlY to disclose, or deceptive
condllct whieh is material, with the operative part of the element being
the requirement of materiality as opposed to the requirement of a
misstatement or omission.
Finding the portion of the first element relating to a misstatement,
omission, or conduct satisfied (or irrelevant), and without considering
materiality, the Court turned to the central basis for its ruling: the
element of reliance 20s Reliance, according to the Court, "ensures that,
for liability to arise, the 'requisite causal connection between a
defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury' exists as a
predicate for liability.,,209 This rationale for the reliance requirement has
caused many, including Justice Stevens in his dissent,"O to liken the
reliance requirement at least in part to transaction or "but-for"
causation.211 The Court seems to assume, rather logically, that the
petitioner could not have aetllally relied upon the respondents' conduct
207. [d. Given the Court's statement here, one might be given to wonder whether "a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant" as an element of a "typical § lO(b)
private action" actually has any meaning beyond just the materiality requirement. Id. at 764.
Further, one might question whether the Court should have even rcached this conclusion given
that it concluded that Charter had made misstatement.. , albeit it ones that had not been
communicated to the petitioner nor the market, thereby arguably rendering the question in this
case moot. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (where the Court
reserved the issue of scienter as unnecessary to the resolution of the case at bar).
208. Stolle ridge, 128 S. Cl. at 769.
209. lei. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) and citing Affiliated
Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972)).
210. Id. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (eiling Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Brauda, 544
U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005)).
211. See Mark D, Wood & Katten Muchin Rosenman, Liability for Securities Law
Violatiolls, 1618 PLI/CORP 587,609-10 (2008) ("Reliance is often referred to as 'transaction
causation.' To satisfy the element, a plaintiff must prave that he or she would not have
bought the security if not for the misstatemenl."); Roberta S. Kannel, When Should l/lvestor
Reliallce be Presumed ill Secllrities Class Actions?, 63 Bus. LAW 25, :13 (2007) ("What is
frequently considered 'transaction causation' is in fact a variant of the reliance requirement.");
Currie v. Cayman Res. Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 785 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Reliance is il causa sine
qua non, a type of 'but for' requirement: had the investor known the truth he would not have
acted."). Others, however, have noted that reliance is broader, including not only transaction
causation but also justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Chrisman, supra
note 15, at 223-24 ("[T]hc already overburdened reliance clement ))hould not be given the
additional task (which is onc that it cannot complete satisfactorily) of determining when a
secondary actor's conduct rise)) to the level of a primary violation of section IO(b) and rule
lOb-5."); Rutheford B, Campbell, Jr., Elemcl1IS of RCCOVCI}' UI/dcr Rille IOb-5: Scienter,
Reliance, lind PllJinrif.{'s Reasollable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.c. L REV. 653, 664-69, 67483,689-93,700-01 (1975).
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in making its investment decision because it did not know about the
respondents' conduct at that time.
Therefore, being unable to show actual reliance, the petItIOner
would have to be able to use a presumption of reliance to be able to
prevail in this case. Thus, the Court stated:
We have found a rebuttable presumption of reliance in two different
circumstances. First, if there is an omission of a material fact by one with a
duty to disclDse, the investor to whom the duty was owed need not provide
specific proof of reliance. Second, under the fraud-on-the-market doctrine,
reliance is presumed when the statements at issue become pUblic. The public
information is reflected in the market price of the security. Then it can be
assumed that an investor who buys or sells stock at the market price relies
'I'

upon the statement. - -

The first presumption (or the "Affiliated Ute" presumption) is not
applicable because the "[r]espondents had no duty to disclose."zI3 The
second presumption (or the "fraud-on-the-market" presumption) is not
applicable because the respondents' "deceptive acts were not
communicated to the public [and therefore n]o member of the investing
public had knowledge, either actual or presumed, of respondents acts
during the relevant times."zI4 Accordingly, the Court concluded,
"[p ]etitioner ... cannot show reliance upon any of respondents' actions
except in an indirect chain that we find too remote for liability.,,215
The petitioner argued, based upon the reasoning in Simpson and In
re Parmaiat Securities Litigalion,216 that the respondents actions were
such that the fraud-on-the-market presumption should apply because the
"conduct [had] the purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of
material fact to further a scheme to misrepresent Charter's revenue."ZI7
Apparently rejecting scheme liability,218 the Court disagreed,
212. Stolleridge, 128 S. Cl. at 769 (citations omincd).
213. Id. The Affiliated Ute presumption rests upon the idea that a plaintiff cannot be said
to actually rely upon statements that were in fact not made by the defendant. Reliance,
therefore, is presumed in such instances where the person was under a duty to speak and did

not do so.
214. ld.
215. Id. The Court's statement here demonstrates its view of the relationship between
reliance and causation. What the Court is really saying is that it is unwilling to create a new
presumption of reliance in this case and the current two do not apply. Therefore, the
petitioner cannot recover.

216.

376 F. Sapp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

217. Stolleridge, 128 S. CL at 770.
218. One might have preferred a morc delinite statement with regards to the viability of
scheme liability. However, it docs seem clear that the Court intended to reject the notion by
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characterizing the petitioner's argument as "contend[ing] that in an
efficient market investors rely not only upon the public statements
relating to a security but also upon the transactions those statements
reflect.,,219 The Court asserts that such a broad definition of reliance
would be unacceptable because it would lead to "the implied [Rule lOb5] cause of action ... reach[ing] the whole marketplace in which the
. . company d
'
,·"0
lSSU1l1g
oesbUSll1ess."Following this, Justice Kennedy turns to the relationship between
reliance and causation "leading to the inquiry whether respondents' acts
were immediate or remote to the injury.,,221 In what may well become
one of the most frequently quoted portions of the opinion, Justice
Kennedy writes:
In all events we conclude respondents' deceptive acts, which were not
disclosed to the investing public, are too remote to satisfy the requirement of
reliance. It was Chalter, not respondents, that misled its auditor and filed
fraudulent financial statements; l1otiJinr: respondellls did 1'Jl
II/{/dl~ it nccessan' or
i1levitablefor CharIer 10 record the transactions os it did.--L

Thus, the Court seems to state that, in order to establish reliance in a
case such as this, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct
(or possibly misstatements not communicated to the plaintiff or the
market) "made it necessary or inevitable for" the primary actor to make
a misstatement upon which the plaintiff relies or about which one of the
presumptions mentioned herein applies. 223
ciling and rejecting Simpson v. AOL Time Wumer Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006); In re
Parrnal"t, 414 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); ond 111 re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative, &

"ERISA" Lilig., 439 F. Supp. 2d 692 (S.D. Tex. 2006), the three of which conslitute the mojor
opinions in support of the theory.
219. Stolleridge, 128 S. Cl. at 770.
220. hi.
221. Id.
222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. Slol/eridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770. Whether Justice Kennedy actually intended to creale
such a lest is certainly debatable. Still, the words of the opinion seem to suggest thm if the
conduct of the vendors had of been such that it made Charter's misstatements necessary or
inevitable, then liability would have been found. Justice Stevens in the dissent seems to agree.
He slates:
The Court's next faulty premise is that petitioner is required to allege that
Scientific-Allama and Motorola made it "necessary or inevitable for Charter to
record the transactions in the way it did," in order to demonstrate reliance. Because
the Court of Appeals did not base its holding on reliance grounds, the fairest course
to petitioner would be ror the majority to remand to the Court of Appeals to
determine whether petitioner properly alleged reliance, under a correct view of
what § 1O(b) covers.
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While the Court couched its holding in terms of reliance, the
majority seems much more concerned about whether its ruling would
expand the § IOCb) and Rule IOb-S cause of action than about proposing
a workable standard for the reliance element. For example, the Court
stated, "[c]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action
caution against its expansion. The decision to extend the cause of action
is for Congress, not for [the Court]. Though it remains the law, the §
IOCb) private right should not be extended beyond its present
boundaries.,,224 Latei' in the opinion, the Court reasoned, "[i]t is
appropriate for us to assume that when [the PSLRA] was enacted,
Congress accepted the § IOCb) private cause of action as then defined but
chose to extend it no further.,,225 Finally, of its holding, the Court
asserts, "[t]his conclusion is consistent with the nan'ow dimensions we
must give to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first
enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.,,226
In conclusion, it is clear that the Court intended to eliminate scheme
liability because the Court was concerned that it would expand the
implied cause of action. In accomplishing its goal, the Court rejected the
idea that a misstatement or omission is required, instead holding that
Id. at 775-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). However, whether this is a standard,

upon which future courts may rely, is debatable. The majority did not stale thm the petitioner
is required to plead that it was "necessary or inevitable for Charter to record the transactions
in the way il did"; rather, the majority simply observed that the respondents did not make it
necessary or inevitable. Id. m 770. This statement may simply be in response to the
petitioners argument that Charter's actions were the natural and expected consequence of the
respondents conduct. Id.
224. ld. at 773. This is a rather astonishing statement. The Court seems to regret or
lament the original creation of the cause of action. Of course, this is consistent with Justice
Robert's comments during the onlI arguments. However, for the majority to so clearly state
its intention not to extend the private cause of action beyond its present point is interesting and
raises numerous questions-the most obvious of which is what are those "present
boundaries?"
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I mean, we don't get in this business of implying
private rights of action any more. And isn't the effort by Congress to legislate a
good signal that they have kind of picked up the ball and they are running with it
and we shouldn't?
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: [M]y suggestion is not that we should go back and
say that there is no pri vale right of action. My suggestion is that we should get Ollt
of the business of expanding it, because Congress has taken over and is legislating
in the area in the way they weren't back when we implied the right of action under
IO(b).
Transcript of Oral Arguments at 6-7, Stollcridge, 127 S. Ct. ] H73 (2007) (No. 06-43).
225. SlOneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 773.
226. /d. at 774.
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conduct as well may be deceptive for the purpose of the § lOeb) implied
cause of action. The Court then reasoned that the element of reliance is
not met and no presumption of reliance should apply in the present
situation. However, it seems the Court's goal of limiting the § lOeb)
implied cause of action would have been better served by ruling for the
respondents on the same grounds that the Eighth Circuit did-namely,
that § lOeb) requires that a secondary actor actually make a misstatement
or omission in order to be held liable as a primary violator. The
following Section considers whether, prior to the Stone ridge opinion,
there would have been support for such a holding.
III. IN THE WAKE OF CENTRAL BANK AND PRIOR TO STONERlDGE, WAS
THERE AN ARGUMENT THAT SECTION 10(B) REQUIRED THAT A
SECONDARY ACTOR ACTUALLY MAKE A MISSTATEMENT (OR
OMISSION) TN ORDER TO BE HELD LIABLE AS A PRIMARY VIOLATOR
UNDER RULE

IOB-5?

Even prior to Central Balik, most courts and commentators seemed
to agree that a violation of § lO(b) for deceptive conduct required either
227
a misstatement or an omission when there was a duty to disclose.
Opinions such as Emst & Ernst 1'. Hoci1f"elder'" and San/a Fe
Industries, Inc. 1'. Green"9 were understood to establish that a secondary
actor must actually (l) make a misstatement or omission coupled with a
duty to disclose (i.e., deceptive conduct),23o or (2) employ a

227.
See .wpm notes 114-15 amI accompanying text. While most commentators and
some courts seemed to waver, the practicing bar appeared to be convinced that the Supreme
Court's precedent on this isslle required a manipulation, misstatement, or omission.
Some recent decisions have treated the issue of liability under Securities Exchange
Act Rule lOb-Sea) or Rule IOb-5(c) as if it were a novel or unseuled question of
federal secUJities law . . . . [Howcver,] the U.S. Supreme Court's Section 10(b)
cases [and other authority demonstratesl that existing precedent already compels
the conclusion that liability under any subp<lrt of Rule IOb-5 requires a
misrepresentation, [an omission coupled with] a duty to disclose, or a manipulative
transaction in the issuer's securities.
McLaughlin, .wpm note 8, at 631. Sec (/lso Gregory A. Markel & Gregory O. Ballard, In re
Charter Communications, Inc. Securitics Litigation lIlld Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.:
Circllits Split Over the Validiry (d "Schellle" Liabiliry UI/dcr SectioJl lO(b), 34 SEC. REG. L. J.
I (2006) (noling that there is practically very little difference between scheme liability and
aiding and abetting).

228.
229.

425 U.S. 185 (1976).
430U.S.462(1977).

230. Chiarella v. United Slates. 445 U.s. 222, 235 (1980) (requiring a duty to disclose
before an omission is actionable under ~ lO(b) and Rule IOb-5). for a full discussion 0('
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manipulation in order to be held liable as a primary violator under §
lO(b) and Rule IOb-S.231 The subsection of Rule IOb-S relied upon was
thought to make little difference because "the language of the statute
[was thought to be] dispositive."m Central Balik seemed to lend further
support to this assumption. 233 However, following Central Ballk,
theories such as the substantial participation test and scheme liability
have arisen that challenged this understanding of § I O(b) and Rule IOb-S
liability.134 The following examines Supreme Court precedent and other
authority to determine whether there existed sufficient grounds for the
Court in Stolle ridge to rule that a misstatement or omission is required
for conduct to be deceptive under § IO(b).
First, following the methodology elucidated in Ernst & Emst v.
Hochfelder,235 and affirmed and followed by Santa Fe Industries, Illc. v.
Green236 and Cellfral Bank, the analysis must begin with the language of
the statute itself. 237 Section lO(b), in relevant part, provides, "[i]t shall
be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, ... [t]o use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the commission may prescribe. ,,238 Section
lO(b) prohibits only "manipulative or deceptive device[s] or
contrivance[s].,,239 The Supreme Court adopted broad definitions of
"device" and "contrivance" by relying upon their dictionary
definitions 24o Accordingly, because the Supreme Court has stated that §
IO(b) "prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or
omission) or tlle commission of a manipulative act,,,24t the operative
terms are not "device or contrivance" but "manipulative or deceptive."
Therefore, this Section and much of this Article focuses on these latter
two tenns.
insider trnding, sec 1 WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING §

5:2.6[C]
231.
(1994).
232.
far more

233.
234.
235.
236.

237.
238.

239,
240.
241.

(2d cd. 2006).
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164

Santa Fe, 430 U.S. m 477. Again. this demonstrates thm the language of the rule is
expansive than the language of the .statute.
Celltral Balik, 511 U.S. at 177.
See supra Part II.
425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
430 U.S. 462, 472-74 (1977).
Celltral Balik, 511 U.S. at 173.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2007) (emphasis added).
ld.
Emst & Emst, 425 U.S. at 199 n.20.
Celltral Balik, 511 U.S. at 177.
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The case most clearly addressing the definition of the terms in §
lOCb) is Ernst & Ernst v. Hocl!felder. Ernst involved a securities fraud
perpetrated by Leston B. Nay, the president and 92% owner of First
Securities Company of Chicago. 242 Nay defrauded certain investors who
became the plaintiffs in Ernst by persuading them to invest funds in
certain "escrow" accounts that he promised would yield high rates of
return. 243 Nay committed suicide some years after the fraud, and his
suicide letter indicated that First Securities was bankrupt and that the
escrow accounts were frauds.,"4
An investigation followed, and the plaintiffs subsequently filed suit
against Ernst & Ernst, First Securities' auditor and accountant, alleging
that Ernst & Ernst violated § lOeb) and Rule IOb-S by failing to discover
and report irregularities at First Securities that would have led to the
discovery of the fraud. 245 The Court stated that discovery revealed that
plaintiffs' "cause of action rested solely on a theory of negligent
nonfeasance. ,,246
The District Court granted Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary
judgment, but disagreed with its "contention that a cause of action for
aiding and abetting a securities fraud could not be maintained under §
IOCb) and Rule IOb-S merely on allegations of negligence.,,247 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, seemingly
holding that negligence would suffice for aiding and abetting liability
under § lOeb) and Rule IOb_S 248 The Supreme Court "granted certiorari
to resolve the question whether a private cause of action for damages
will lie under § lOCb) and Rule IOb-S in the absence of any allegation of
sc ienter. ,,,249
In determining that the language of the statute required more than
mere negligence, the Supreme Court focused on the statutory language
itself as opposed to tort or criminal law. "[W]e turn first to the language
of § lOeb), for '[tlhe starting point in every case involving construction
4

242, Emsl & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 189.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 190.
246. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 190.
247. Id. at 19l.
248. Id. at 191·93.
249. ld. at 193 (limiling the issue before the Court to the scienter requirement, and
reserving the aiding nod abetting issue which it later addressed in Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)).
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of a statute is the language itself. ",151l To determine the deflnitions for
the tenns of the statute, the Court cited the 1934 Webster's illiemationai
Dictiollary?" As to "device" and "contrivance," the Court cited the
dictionary's rather broad deflnitions without gloss.252 However, as to
"manipulative," the Court cited the dictionary definition but then went
on to limit the deflnition with regard to the § lO(b) cause of action.253
Of manipulative, the Court stated, "[ilt is and was virtually a term of art
when used in connection with the securities markets. It connotes
intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors
by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.,,254 This
definition of "manipulative" has been cited and quoted with approval by
the Supreme Court and other federal courts on numerous occasions. m
Accordingly, it is well settled that conduct must involve some form of
manipulative trading practices in the issuer's securities, such as wash
sales, matched orders, rigged prices, or the like in order to be
"manipulative" within the meaning of § IO(b).'56 In Siolleridge, the
issue of "manipulative" conduct under § lOCb) was not addressed by the
question on appeal. Rather, the question on appeal focllsed on the other
operative term that the Supreme Court has yet to define-"deceptive.,,257

250. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975». The Court in Stoneridgt! followed this pattern of not w:iing
criminal or tort law principles tu inform § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 jurisprudence, but, perhaps
surprisingly, did nOl cite Ernst & Ems!. "Section IO(b) does not incorporate common-law
fraud into federal law." Stoncridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
761,771 (2008) (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002); Celllrai B'lTlk, 5 II U.S. 164;
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)).
251. Ernst & Emsl, 425 U.S. at J99, nn.20-21.
252. Id. at 199 n.20.
253. Id. at 199.
254. /d. at 199 (quoting WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 12d ed. 1934) in note
21, which defines manipulate with regard to "exchanges" as "[t]o force (prices) up or down,
as by matched orders, wash sales, fictitious reports . .. ; to rig"). Interestingly, the Court did
not discuss or define "deceptive" in its discussion of the statute. Further, to date, the Court
has not done so. See also Regents of the Uniy. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA),
Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 389 (5th Cir. 2007).
255. See United Slates v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. I (1985); Sanla Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); 111 re
Citigroup, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); S.E.C. v. Cavanagh, I F. Supp. 2d 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Arioli v. Pruden Ii aI-Bache Sec., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Mich. 1992);
Pross v. Baird, Patrick & Co., Inc., 5S5 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 111 re Commonwealth
Oilrresoro Petroleum Corp., 467 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Tex., 1979).
256. Sail/{( Fe, 430 U.S. at 476, 477.
257.
Ems! & Ems!, 425 U.S. at 193.
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Further, the Court rejected the SEC's arguments that subsection (b)
or (c) of Rule IOb-5 would encompass negligent conduct if standing
alone.25S In responding to the SEC's arguments, the Court stated:
Rule lOb-5 was adopted pursuant to authority granted the Commission under §
lOeb). The rulcmaking power granted to an administrative agency charged
with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law.
Rather, it is "the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of
Congress as expressed by the statute." Thus, despite the broad view of the
Rule advanced by the Commission in this case, its scope cannot exceed the
power granted the Commission by Congress under § 1O(b )?59

Here, the Supreme Court applied the axiomatic principle that an
administrati ve regulation or rule cannot exceed the scope of the statute
under which it is enacted 260 However, that being said, the language of
Rule IOb-5(a) and particularly (c) is exceptionally broad and would
seem to cover negligence in addition to various other types of "fraud,"
and is therefore plainly beyond the scope of the statute. One is therefore
left to conclude that the Court is actually stating that Rule IOb-5 extends
liability all the way to the limits of § IO(b) but no further.
Most courts and commentators have assumed that the definition of
"deceptive" was a relatively settled matter as well, requiring either a
misstatement or omission.'61 Generally, courts and commentators had
258. [d. at 20 I, 212 (finding that negligence is not surticiem, the Court declined to rule
on whether intent is required or whether some lesser degree of culpability, such as
recklessness, would suffice).
259.

[d. at 212·14 (citing Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)). Again, note

that Ems! & Emst was not cited by the Court in Stolleridge.
260. See sl/pm note 53 and accompanying text.
261. See 5;llpm nale 188 and i/lfra notes 302-03 and accompanying text. See, e.g.,
HAZEN, sIlpra note 38, § 12.4 ("Since section lOeb) speaks in terms of deceptive acts,
'deception' is a necessary element of any Rule IOb-5 violation. Thus, RIlle IOb*5 focllses 011
disclosure alld misrepreselllatioll alld does flot cover all trallsactiolls that came injury or
otherwise result in Ilfzjdime,ys to investors.") (footnotes omilted and emphasis added) (citing
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. I (l985);.Snllta Fe, 430 U.S. 462; ErnSI &
Ernst, 425 U.S. 185). See also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First interstate Bank of Denver,

N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) ("As in earlier cases considering conduct prohibited by

S

10(b), we again conclude that the statute prohibits only the making of a material misstatement
(or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act."); Plotkin v. IP AxeS5 Inc., 407 F.3d
690, 702 (5th Cif. 20(5) (conduding tbat the plaintiff successfully pleaded "the first element
of a rule JOb-5 claim (material misstatement or omission)"); Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220,
235 (6th Cif. 2004) ("[B]ecause Ernst & Young itself did not make a lIlateriaimisstatelllcllf or
omissio/1 with regard to the unaudited financials, it cannot be held liable under Section ID(b)
even if it') failure to insist on revisions to the figures or its consent to the inclusion of the audit
report of 1998 financial data can be construed as assisting Fruit or the Loom in engaging in
securities fraud with respect to the 1999 unaudited figures. Central Ballk simply does not
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concluded that anyone who does not employ a manipulation must make
a misstatement or omission to be held liable under § lO(b) for deceptive
conduct. 262 For example, this author has previously noted that "[t]he
Supreme Court has seemingly categorized anything that is not a
misstatement or an omission as a manipulation, which has been defined
as a term of art that covers wash sales, matched orders, and the like,
Consequently, courts and commentators focus on misstatements and
omissions as the two main categOlies of primary violations by secondary
actors,::263 Now, at least on the part of some, there seems to be

ullow the result that the class members urge us to reach." (emphasis added)); Olkey v.
Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., 98 F.3d 2, 9 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[Plaintiffs'] expectatinns were
not deceptively manipulated but were simply unmeL The prospectuses contained no material
misstatements or omissions of fact, and the plaintiffs fail to state a claim under either the 1933
or 1934 Acts, or under common law fraud."); Ziemba v. Cascade Inl'l, Tnc., 256 F.3d 1194,
1205 (lIth eir. 2001) ("{l]n light of Central Balik, in order [or the defendant to be primarily
liable under § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5, the alleged misstatement or omission upon which a
plaintiff relied must have been publicly attributable to the defendant at the time that the
plaintiff's investment decision was made."); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169,
175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999) ("If Cell/rat Bank is to have any real
meaning, a defendant must actually make a false or misleading statement in order to be held
liable under Section 10(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abelting, and
no matter how substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section

lO(b)."); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[I]n order
for accountants to 'usc or employ' a 'deception" actionable under the ami fraud law, they must
themselves make a false or misleading statement (or omission) that they know or should know
will reach potential investors.").
262. Chrisman, supra note 15, at 221.
263. ld. at 219 11.114 (citing Prentice, supra note 18; Sallta Fe, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
Ems! & Ernst, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); and several cases following CCllIral Balik, 511 U.S. 164
(1994)). Prentice notes that "the Supreme Court has tcnded to lump all deceptive activity not
involving misrepresentations or omissions into the 'manipulation' category, and then to hold
that 'manipulation' is a virtual term of an for practices such as wash sales, matched orders, or
rigged prices that are intended to mislead investors." Prentice, slipra note 18, at 699 n.30
(citing Sal/ta Fe, 430 U.S. at 472-74; Emst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199). Taavi Annus calls this
approach the "restrictive view." Annus, supra note 18, at 878. He states that "some courts,
including the Fifth and Eight Circuits, hold that there arc only three bases for liability under
lOeb): misrepresentation, omission when there is a duty to speak, and market manipulation."
ld. at 877. Annus proceeds to reject this view by claiming, "[t]he restrictive view is clearly
not firmly founded on the language of Rule IOb-5." hl. at 883. Then Annus recognizes the
argument made herein that the scope of Rule lOb-5 exceeds the scope of § lO(b) only to reject
it because the statute proscribes "any" device or contrivance, not merely fraudulent
misstatements or omissions. Id. at 884. Annus does nOI seek to discover the meaning of
deceptive and manipulative, and in fact ignores the common categorization spelled out by
Prentice above. Interestingly enough, Professor Fischel predicted that some would find this
approach too restrictive and insensitive 10 the needs of unprotected investors; however,
Professor Fischel reminds the reader that it is Congress' job to defIne the scope of proscribed
conduct, not the courts, and the courts should recognize this delegation of authority and refuse

*
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significant uncertainty about this question 264 Further, Stoneridge puts
this question squarely before the Court: does § lOeb) require a
misstatement or omission?265
The 1934 Webster's New International Dictionarv defines
"deceptive" as "[tlending to deceive; having power to rcislead.,,266
Clearly, this language is extremely broad and would include
misstatements and omissions as well as conduct without a misstatement
or omission. In fact, this definition. coupled with the broad definitions
of device and contrivance, would encompass nearly any fraudulent
activity imaginable as long as it is "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.,,267 The Supreme Court, however, has clearly stated
that not all instances of financial unfairness amount to a violation of
Rule lOb_5. 268 Perhaps not surprisingly, the Court has never turned to
this definition in interpreting the meaning of the term "deceptive" in §
lO(b). Rather, the Court seems to have preferred to define the term
"deceptive" over time through case law.
The Supreme Court in Stone ridge did not cite or quote this
dictionary definition of deception, but it apparently adopted such a
definition by its conclusion that "deceptive" encompasses conduct not
involving misstatements or omissions.'69 This left the Court with the
option of either ruling in favor of the petitioner and theretly endorsing
scheme liability, or ruling for the respondents on other grounds. Rightly
concerned that endorsing scheme liability would create a huge expansion
of the potential defendant class under § lOeb) and Rule lOb-5, possibly

to imply private rights of action or expand private rights of action. Fischel, slIpra note 11, at
I I I.
264.

See Annus, slIpra note 18, at 884 ("[TJhe use of 'any' deceptive device or
conlri vance is prohibited. not only the usc of fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions.").
COli/pore III re Charter Comme'os, 443 F.3d 987, 992 (2006) ("[T]he district court properly

dismissed the claims against the Vendors as nothing more than claims, baITed by Celltml
Bank, that the Vendors knowingly aided ilnd abetted the Charter defendants in deceiving the
investor plaintiffs."), with Simpson v. AOL Time Warncr Inc .. 4S2.F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cif.
2006) ("[TJo be liable as a primary violator of
10(b) for participation in a 'scheme to
defraud,' the defendant must have engaged in conduct that had the prillcipal pUlpose lind
effeCT of creating a false appearance of fact in furtherance of the scheme." (emphasis added»,
alld In re Parnmlat, 414 F. Supp. ld 428 (S.D.N.Y 2006) (holding that a misrepresentation or
omission is not necessary when the plaintiffs arc proceeding under the theory lOb-Sea) or (c».
265. See slIpra note 29 and accompanying lext.
266. WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d cd. 1934).
267.
IS U.S.C.A. § 7Sj(b) (WesI2006).
268. Celllrai BOllk, 51 I U.S. at 174.
269. Sloneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. CL 76[, 769 (2008)
("Conduct itself can be deceptive, as respondents concede.").

*
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expanding it beyond even what it was under aiding and abetting,270 the
Court took the second option and ruled for the respondents on other
grounds, that is reliance,271 Chief Justice Roberts's statements during
oral arguments foreshadowed the expected direction of the Court, and
probably voiced the ultimate reasoning behind the decision, when he
stated, "we don't get in this business of implying private rights of action
any more, [M]y suggestion is not that we should go back and say that
there is no private light of action, My suggestion is that we should get
out of the business of expanding iL,,272 Ruling that a misstatement or
omission is required for liability under § lOeb) would have certainly
accomplished this goal of not expanding the Rule lOb-S private right of
action, It remains to be seen, however, whether the Court's ruling based
upon reliance will have the same result
Further, there is a plausible argument based upon the precedent of
the Court and other authority that the Court could have relied upon the
rule that a misstatement or omission is required by § lOeb), The
Supreme Court could have decided that "deceptive," like manipulative,
is a virtual "term of art" within the securities statutes,273 In fact, the
Court seems to have done just that in Sail/a Fe Industries, Inc, v,
Green,m San/a Fe involved a Delaware short-form merger whereby
Santa Fe Industries merged with its subsidiary, Kirby Lumber Corp,

270.
Id. at 771 ("Were we to adopi this construction or § IO(b), it would revive in
substance the implied cause of action against all aiders and abettors except those who
committed no deceptive act in the process of facilitating the fraud; and we would undermine
Congress' determination that this class of defendanls should be pur!iued by the SEC and not
by private litigants."). Further, this author i!i aware of no instance where aiding and abetting
liability was used to reach vendors who deal! with the primary violmor as proposed in scheme
liability. Therefore, arguably, scheme liability would actually extend liability beyond even
the scope of aiding and abetting to "the entire marketplace in which the issuing company
operates." fd. at 777 n.4. See, e.g., Schanhaurn, supra note 18, at 185 (noting that prominent
cases endorsing scheme liability "appear to extend the reach of secondary actor liability under
section 10(b) back to its pre~Cell1ra! Hank limits").
271.
Id. at 774 CIn these circumstances the investors cannal be said to have relied upon
any of respondents' deceptive acts in the decision to purchase or sell securities; and as the
requisite reliance cannot be shown, respondents have no liability to petitioner under the
implied right of action.").
272. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 6-7. STolleritige, 127 S. CL 1873 (2007) (No. 0643).
273. Ernst & E.rnst v. Hochrelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) ("It is and was virtually a
term of art when llsed in connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful
conduct designed to ueceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the
price of securities.").
274. 430 U,S, 462 (1977).
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("Kirby,,).275 The Delaware short-form merger statute provides that a
parent company owning at least ninety percent of the stock of its
subsidiary company may cause the subsidiary to be merged with the
parent upon the vote of the parent's board of directors and without the
approval or even the prior notification of the minority shareholders of
the subsidiary.276 Notice of the merger must be given to the minority
shareholders within ten days following the consummation of the merger,
and the minority shareholders may take the payment of cash offered fill
their stock in the subsidiary, or they may pursue an appraisal remedy in
the Delaware Court of Chancery.-'77
Santa Fe, over a period of time, acquired ninety-five percent of the
outstanding shares of Kirby through a wholly-owned subsidiary, Santa
Fe Natural Resources, Inc.278 In order to acquire the remaining five
percent, Santa Fe engaged in a short-form merger with Kirby whereby
Santa Fe Natural Resources, Inc. transferred the Kirby stock along with
cash to a new wholly-owned subsidiary, Forest Products, Inc., in
exchange for all of the Forest Products stock. -'79 Forest Products and
Kirby were then merged with Kirby as the surviving corporation 280 The
cash that was contributed to Forest Products was used to make the
purchase offer of $150 per share to the Kirby minority shareholders 281
In order to arrive at the $150 per share price, Santa Fe obtained
independent appraisals of the Kirby assets (which consisted primarily of
various natural resources and assets related thereto )282 These appraisals,
along with other financial information about Kirby, were submitted to an
investment banking finn charged with appraising the fair market value
of the Kirby stock. 283 Kirby's physical assets were appraised at $640 per
share, and Kirby's stock was appraised at $125 per share.'S" Santa Fe
then decided to offer the minority shareholders of Kirby $150 per
share 285 Santa Fe fully complied with all of the requirements of the

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

ld. a1465.
Sec DEL. CODE ANN. lit. 8, § 263 (2008) (also called a § 263 merger).
See § 262.
SOIlIa Fe, 430 U.S. "1465, 466 n.2.
ld. al466 n.3.
ld.
ld. al 466.
Sallta Fe, 430 U.S. at 466.
ld.
ld.

Id.

QLR

888

rvol. 26:839

Delaware short form merger statute, and the merger was ultimately
consummated. 286
The plaintiffs in Santa Fe alleged that their stock was worth at least
$772 per share. 287 Rather than pursuing their state-law appraisal
remedy, however, they sued in federal court under § 10(b) and Rule 10b5?88 Among other allegations,289 the plaintiffs primmily alleged that
Santa Fe engaged in a "course of conduct ... [in] violation of Rule lObS because defendants employed a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
. and engaged in an act, practice or course of business which operates or'
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any secmity.,,290 The quoted language is drawn
directly from Rule IOb-5(a) and (C)?91 As the Court also noted, the
plaintiffs' "principal argument ... alleges a fraud under clauses (a) and
(e) of Rule IOb-5.,,292
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim under Rule IOb-5.293 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed in part, holding that even '''without any misrepresentation or
failure to disclose relevant facts, the merger itself constitntes a violation
of Rule IOb-5' because it was accomplished without any corporate
purpose and without prior notice to the minority stockholders.,,294 In

286.
287.
288.

Sallla Fe, 430 U.S. a1466 n.3.
ld. at467.
ld.

289. The plaintiffs also alleged misstatements or omissions as they relate to the
majOIity's failure to give them advance notice of the merger. However, the opinion only
tangentially addresses this secondary argument. Id. at 474 n.14.
290. Sallta Fe, 430 U.S. ot467·68 (internal quo1ation marks omitted).
291. See supra nole 13 and accompanying text.
292. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 4740.14. By reading commentators' articles, one would be
inclined to think that scheme liability is the first attempt at using Rule lOb-5(a) to impose
liability on a secondary actor. See, e.g., Schanbaum, supra note 18. However, the
shareholders in SonIa Fe had the same idea that the plaintiffs bar conjured up after Cel1lral
Bank, that is 10 hold secondary actors liable when the secondary actor did not make a
misstatement or omission. Given the ohvious relevance of the analysis in Santa Fe and the
conceptual similarity of the arguments offered by the plaintiffs in Sal1la Fe and Stoneridge, it
is somewhat astonishing that the Court in Stoneridge only cites Santa Fe twice and neither
lime for any of its central holdings discussed in this Article. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. CL 761, 769 (2008) (citing Santa Fe, rather than Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), for the proposition that "manipulative" is a term of art).
See also Stolleridge, 128 S. CL at 771 (citing SOllta Fe for the proposition that § lO(b) and
Rllie 10b-5 should not be expanded to "cover the corporate universe").

293.
294.

Sallta Fe. 430 U.S. at 468.
ld. at 469.

2008]

STONERIDGE V. SCiENTlFlC·ATLANTA

889

further commenting on the Second Circuit's opinion, the Santa Fe Court
stated:
The Coun of Appeals' view was that, although the Rule plainly reached
material misrepresentations and nondisclosures in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, neither misrepresentatiofl nor nondisclosure was
a necessary elemellt of a Rule IOb-5 action; the Rule reached "breaches of

fiduciary duty by a majority against minority shareholders without any charge
of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure." . " We granted the petition [or
certiorari challenging this holding because of the importance of the issue
involved to the administration of the federal securities laws. We reverse?95

In reversing, the Court relied almost entirely upon the language of the
statute itself, holding that "[tlhe language of § 10(b) gives no indication
that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation
or deception.,,296 Therefore, the Court concludes, a "complaint states a
cause of action under any part of Rule IOb-5 only if the conduct alleged
can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive' within the meaning
of the statute.,,297
Turning to the issue of manipUlative conduct first,298 the Supreme
Court had no trouble finding that there was no manipulation within the
meaning of § lO(b).299 Relying on and quoting Ernst, the Court stated:
It is ... readily apparent that the conduct alleged in the complaint was not
"manipulative" within the meaning of the statute. "Manipulation" is "virtually
a term of art when used in connection with securities markets." The term
refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged
prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
..
300
actIvIty.

As noted in the discussion of Ernst herein, manipulation is used in a
technical sense in the securities acts, and relates only to activities that
tend to artificially affect the market activity in an issuer's securities in
order to deceive investors]O'

295.
296.
297.

Id. at 470· 71 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 473.
Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473·74.

298.

The Court actually dealt with the issue of deception first, but, for the purposes of

this Article, the more straightforward analysis regarding manipulation is first discussed.
299. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476.
300. Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199).
301. See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.

R90

QLR

rvol. 16:839

In discussing the issue of deceptive conduct, the Supreme Court
noted that the case came to the Court on the premise that the complaint
failed to allege a material misrepresentation or material failure to
disclose. 3m The Court went on to state that the cases cited by the
plaintiffs stated the principle that § 1O(b) should be interpreted flexibly
and not technically, "[b]ut the cases do not support the proposition,
adopted by the Court of Appeals below and urged by [the plaintiffs]
here, that a breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without
any deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, violates the statute
and the Rule.,,303
While undoubtedly relevant to the issues in Stoneridge, the
concluding portion of the above quote is somewhat ambiguous. It
appears to create a three part list that includes deception, misstatements,
and omissions. However, the Court in this section of the opinion
appears to discuss what amounts to deception. Therefore, the choice to
structure the sentence to include deception in the list of items, apparently
explaining what deception consists of, is ambiguous, unhelpful, and
unfortunate 304

302. SUIIIIl Fe. 430 U.S. at 474.
303. ld. ill 476. Accord HAZEN, supra note 38, § 12.8[1] ("'Manipulation' is a term of
art that is limited to certain specific types of trading practices and thus is not applicable in
most antifraud cases.").
304. Justice Kennedy in Stolleridge is even Jess careful in discussing these two operative
tefms in the statute. In discussing the Eighth Circuit's opinion, he seems to conflalc
"deceptive" and "manipulative," and seems to conclude that "deceptive" is the only operative
term, and thus for liability for a manipulation to attach it too would have to be "deceptive."
Of the Eighth Circuit's opinion, he writes:
The Court of Appeals concluded petitioner had not alleged that respondents
engaged in a deceptive act within the reach of the § lOCb) private right of action,
noting that only misstatements, omissions by one who has a dUly to disclose, and
manipulative trading practices (where "manipulative" is a term of art, see, e.g.,
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977)) are deceptive
within the meaning of the rule.
Stoneridge lnv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S, CI. 761, 769 (2008).
However, Justice Kennedy'S characterization of the Eighth Circuit's position is not correct, as
the Eighth Circuit did not connate the two operative terms "manipulative" and "deceptive,"
Rather. the Eighth Circuit maimained a rather clear understanding of the distinction of the two
terms. For instance, the Court of Appeals wrote, "[a] device or contrivance is not 'deceptive,'
within the meaning of § 10(b), absent some misstatement or a failure to disclose by one who
has a duty to disclose." 11/ re Charter Commc'ns, Inc" 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cif. 2006)
(citing SCinta Fe, 430 U,S. at 474-75). The Court of Appeals goes on to stale, "[t]hus, any
defendant who does not make or affirmatively cause to be made a fraudulent misstatement or
omission [i.e., engage in "deceptive" conduct], or who does not directly engage in
manipulative securities trading practices, is at most guilLy of aiding and abcuing and cannot be
held liable under § lO(b) or any subpart of Rule lOb-S." hi. (citing a long list of caseS as
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Despite this unfortunate sentence structure. commentators (and
indeed the Supreme Court in Central Bank) have understood this portion
of Santa Fe in conjunction with Emst to require that a secondary actor
must either engage in a deception (i.e., make a material misstatement or
omission) or employ a manipnlation (i.e., wash sales, matched orders, or
other activities tending to artificially affect trading in an issuer's
securities) in order for its conduct to constitute a violation of the
30'
statute. ) Later, in Central Bank, the Supreme Court repeatedly and
with approval cited Professor Daniel R. Fischel's article entitled
Secondary Liability Under Section JO(b) of the Securities Act of 1934,
where Professor Fischel had reached a similar conclusion. 306 In a
portion of his article cited by the Supreme Court as support for its
central holding in Central Bank, Professor Fischel applies his
understanding of the Supreme Court precedent on § 10(b), including
Santa Fe and Ernst, to a number of factual situations. He notes that the
central issue is "whether the [secondary actor] engaged in a
'manipulative or deceptive' practice within the meaning of section 10(b)
as those terms have been interpreted by the Supreme Court.,,307 Earlier
in his article, with regard to the definition of those terms, he stated that
"[r]ecent decisions make clear that in order to fall within the statutory
prohibition, a defendant ... must make a material misrepresentation or
wrongfully fail to disclose despite a fiduciary duty to do so ... or engage
in a manipulative practice designed to mislead investors by artificially
being in accord with this understanding). Finally, in a footnote to the opinion, the Court of
Appeals makes a clear distinction between the two operative terms wilen it states, "[wle agree
with thcn-districtjudge Patrick Higginbotham that the Supreme Court in Sawa Fe intended to
lim..it § 1O(b) claims of unlaw/ItimalliplIlatioll (as opposed to deceptioll) to 'transactions in the
[securities] marketplace, the effects of which were to prevent the market price from accurately
reflecting the market's unimpeded judgment of the stock's value.'" lei. at 992 n.2 (emphasis
added) (quoting Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1360 (N.D. Tex.
1979)). it is unfortunate that Justice Kennedy's analysis lacked the clarity of the Eighth
Circuit's on this issue.
305. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S:
164 (1994); Sallta Fe, 430 U.S. at 474·75; Affiliated Ute Citizens nf Utah v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 153·54 (1972); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653·55 (1997); Fidel
v. Farley, 392 P.3d 220, 235 (6th Cif. 2004); Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194,
1204·06 (11th Cif. 2001); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cif. 1998),
eert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999); Anixter v. Home·Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225·27
(lOth Cif. 1996); III re Software Toolworks, SO P.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cif. 1994); III re
Dynegy, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 804, 914·16 (S.D. Tex. 2004); III re HomeslOre.eom, Inc., 252
F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1040-41 (CO. CaL 2003). See a/so illji-{J notes 322-28 and accompanying
text.
306. 69 CAL. L. REV. 80 ([981), cited ill Celltral BalIk, 501 U.S. at 169, 184. and 191.
307. Id. at L06.
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affecting market activity.,,308 Since Central Bank, other commentators
have reached similar conclusions.
The Supreme Court has seemingly categorized anything that is not a

misstatement or un omission as a manipulation, which has been defined as a
term of art that covers wash sales, matched orders, and the like ....
Consequently, [prior to tile introduction of scheme liability], courts and
commentators [had] focus[ed] on misstatements and omissions as the two main
'f
'
'I
' by secan d ary actors. 309
categones
0 pnmary
V!O
atlons

Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,3tO while not addressing §
lOeb) and Rule lOb-5, provides some support for the argument that a
misstatement or omission is required as well. Schreiber involved a
hostile tender offer turned friendly merger agreement. It was decided
under § 14(e) as opposed to lOeb). However, the Court noted, "Section
l4(e) adds a 'broad antifraud prohibition' modeled on the antifraud
provisions of § lOeb) of the Act and Rule lOb_5.,,311 Further, the
language of sections lOeb) and l4(e) are very similar.312 Thus, an
interpretation of 14(e), while not dispositive of the issue with regard to
lOeb), is at least instructive.
The issue before the Court in Schreiber was whether a
misrepresentation or omission was required for liability to attach for an
allegedly manipulative trading practice. 313 In that regard, the Court held
"that the term 'manipulative' as used in § 14(e) requires
misrepresentation or nondisclosure. It connotes 'conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the

308. lei. at 102-03 (citing Sallta Fe, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. 185
(1976)).
309. Chrisman, supra note 15, at 219 n.114 (citations omitted).
310. 472 U.S. I (1985).
311. Id. at 10 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1,24 (1977)).
312. Compare § lO(b), supra note 12, with § 14(e):

(e) Untrue statement of material facl'or omission offnet with respect to tender offer
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material facl necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading,
or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or nny
solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any sllch offer,
request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by
rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent,
such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulalive.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(e) (West 2008).
313. Schrieber, 472 U.S. at 2.
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price of securities.' Without misrepresentation or nondisclosure, § 14(e)
has not been violated."JI4 Further, earlier in its analysis, the Court stated
that "we have interpreted 'manipulative' in th[e § IOCb)] context to
require misrepresentation."J 15 One might argue that, if "manipulative"
requires a misstatement or omission, certainly "deceptive" would require
the same. In fact, the Court in Schreiber seems to base its conclusion in
part on the idea that a manipulation must also be deceptive or fraudulent,
and to be deceptive or fraudulent it must include a misstatement or
omission. Jl6 The Court reasons that the purpose of the Securities Acts is
to mandate disclosure, not to police the soundness or fairness of
investments, and therefore there is no violation absent a failure of
disclosure (i.e., a misstatement or omission).J17
Schreiber, however, certainly is not dispositive and is the not the
strongest case in support of the proposition stated herein. Even prior to
Stolle ridge, Schreiber had been questioned. Professor Hazen describes it
as a "highly questionable opinion,,,JI8 and that if it were to "be extended
to section lOeb) of the Act ... [it] would [cause] some question as to the
Commission's ability to regulate [manipulative trading practices] where
all of the terms are fully disciosed."JI9 Further, the Court's holding in
314. Id. at 12 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1985)).
315. Id. at 8-9 (ciling Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977); Piper
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1,43 (1977); Ernst & Emst, 425 U.S. at 199).
316. Id. at6-1!.
3l7. Schreiber, 471 U.S.at6-1!'
318. HAZEN, s/lpra note 38, § 6.l.
319. ld. § 6.4. Further discussing the Schreiber opinion, Professor Hazen writes:

In what could be a very far-reaching decision, the Supreme Court in Schreiber
v. Burlington Northern, IIlC., limited the scope of § 14(e). Schreiber involved a
claim that the defendant target company's renegotiation of the terms of a tender
offer was manipulative and hence in violation of section 14(e). Rather than directly
face the issue of defining manipUlative conduct, the Court held that "[wlithout
misrepresentation or nondisclosure section 14(e) has not been violated."
The Court reached this conclusion by a tortured reading of the statutory text
and a rather unusual view of the section's legislative history. When enacted in
1968, section 14(e) prohibited material misrepresentations and omissions of
material fact as well as "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices" in
connection with a tender offer. The Court's interpretation ignores the disjunctive
use of "or" in the express statutory language. In reviewing the legislative history,
the Court viewed disclosure as the sale thrust of the section. In 1970, the statute
was amended to gi ve the SEC rule making power with regard to "fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative" acts. The Court did not view this amendment as
broadening the disclosure thrust of section 14(e). As a result of the Schreiher
decision, unless the Court retrenches from its unwarranted broad-brush approach, it
seems clear that not only is section 14(e) on its face limited to disclosure but also
any rules promulgated thereunder are invalid to the extent thut lhey go beyond
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Stoileridge that even the term "deceptive" does not require a
misstatement or omission would seem to greatly call into question the
holding in Schreiber, and arguably could lead to additional litigation
under § 14(e) to determine the new scope of § 14(e) following
3'0
SIOllen·dge:In further support of the proposition that a misstatement or
omission is required, the Court in Stoneridge could have tumed to the
legislative history of the express civil liabilities provided for in the 1934
Act. The Supreme Cou·rt has held that analysis of the express causes of
action can be relevant to determining Congress's intent as to the implied
causes of action. 321 In Ernst, the Court quotes the following from the
legislative history of the express civil liabilities provided in the 1934
Act.
[TJhe bill provides that any person who unlawfully manipulates the price of a
security, or who induces transactions in a security by means of false or
misleading statements, or who makes a false or misleading statement in the
report of a corporation, shall be liable in damages to those who have bought or
sold the security at prices affected by such violation or statement. In such case
the burden is on the plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the statement
322
was false or misleading, and that he relied thereon to his damage.

This excerpt seems to recognize a dichotomy in the express civil
liabilities provided for under the 1934 Act between liabilities attaching
for manipulations and liabilities attaching for misstatements

disclosure. This would result in a significant cut-hack on Regulation 14E and also
would be a most questionable narrowing of the scope of the section. The statute
expressly talks in terms of manipulative in addition to fraudulent and deceptive
conduct, and the Supreme Court cannot properly excise that term from the statute.
Even beyond the section J4(e) and Regulation 14E ramifications ... , the
impact of the Schreiber decision could arguably be camed over to section lOeb),
which predates section 14(e) and empowers the SEC to promulgate rules declaring
unlawful conduct that constitutes a "manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance." Extending the Schreiber rationale too liberally to section IO(b)
would lead to the unwise and unfortunate resull of invalidating a number of the
section lO(b) rules dealing with manipulative conduct.
Id. § 11.6[1] (footnotes omilled).
320. The Court in Schreiber suffered in part from the same mistake that Justice Kennedy
made-confusing and connating manipUlation and deception, and ignoring the disjunctive
"or" between the two terms. Still, Schreiber is ilIustrmivc of the vast majority of courts and
commentators that had concluded that § JO(b) required a misstatement or manipulation prior
to SlOlleridge and scheme liability_
321. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfeldcr, 425 U.S. 185.200-01 (1985).
322. Id. at 205-06 (quoting S. REp. No. 73-792, at 12-13 (1934)).
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(deceptions).323 In other words, in the express civil liability provisions, a
person can generally be held liable for "manipulat[ing] the price of a
security" or "induc[ingl transactions in a security by means of false or
misleading statements.,,314 Similarly, under § lOeb), a person can be
held liable for a manipulative or deceptive ("false or misleading
statements") device or contrivance. This exact dichotomy is what the
Santa Fe Court seems to be establishing325 and what the Central Bank
Court would later endorse]16 Surprisingly, this excerpt is not cited in
Santa Fe or Central Bank, but it does lend some support to the
arguments proffered therein. 327
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing and despite statements to
the contrary, there was a solid argument plior to Sloneridge that a
secondary actor must make a misstatement or omission or engage in a
manipulation to commit a primary violation of § lOeb) and Rule lOb-5,
regardless of the subsection of the rule relied upon.328 Unfortunately, no
party seems to have argued this position before the Court. Further,
recognizing at least in part that most commentators would conclude that
the Eighth Circuit held for the respondents based upon this argument, the
Court rejects it with little or no analysis, simply stating that "[ilf [the
ruling of the Eighth Circuit] were read to suggest there must be a
specific oral or written statement before there could be liability under §
lOeb) or Rule IOb-5, it would be erroneous ... [because clonduct itself
can be deceptive, as respondents concede.,,319
As discussed in Part I of this Article, Central Bank clearly rejected
private aiding and abetting causes of action "because the text of § lOeb)
does not prohibit aiding and abetting" and by implication rejected all

323. interestingly, the language of Rule lOb-5 was hurriedly drafted and based upon § 17
of the 1933 Act to which this legislative history would not apply. See infra Part IV. Perhaps
much of the confusion results from thal. However, this should not affect the ruling of the
Court in light of its clear holdings that the rule cannot exceed the scope of the statute. See
supra notes 53, 259-60 and accompanying text. .
324. Ernst & Ernst. 425 U.S. al205-06 (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-792, al 12-13 (1934)).
325. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (J 977).
326. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994); see infra notes 336-38 and accompanying text
327. Of course, this excerpt was not cited or discussed in Stolleridge either.
328. There is no need for specific analysis of the elements here because the statute is
dispm;itive. Further, as noted previously, the language of the rule is so broad that the statute
becomes the limiting factor. See Grundfest, slIprn note 146.
329. Stoneridge Inv. Panners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761,769
0.008). This causes one to wonder what parts of Sallla Fe, Ernst & Ernst, and CelHra/ Bank
might have been impliedly overruled by Stolleridge.
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secondary liability (except controlling person liability).33D However,
proponents of scheme liability frequently ignored the central holding of
Celllrai Bank, instead focusing on the Court's statement that "[tJhe
absence of § lOeb) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that
secondary actors . .. are always free from liability under the securities
Acts.,,331 Here, the usage of the term "secondary actor" caused some to
confuse "secondary actor" with "secondary violator.',332 Specifically,
the use of the term "secondary actor" led some to assert that secondary
actors may be somehow liable for something less than a primary
violation, which is a secondary violation. However, this misses the
central point of Central Bank, that is that a primary or secondary actor
must be a primary violator in order to be held liable under § IOCb). The
use of the term "secondary actor" relates only to the party's role in the
transaction, not secondary or imputed liability. This becomes clear
when one looks just beyond the selective quotation to see that the
prerequisite for "secondary actor" liability is the use of "a manipulative
device or [the making of! a material misstatement (or omission) on
which the purchaser or seller of securities relies ... assnming all of the
requirements for primary liability under rule I Db-S are meL,,333 Finally,
the Court notes that the plaintiffs in Central Bank "named four
330.

Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. See also SlIpra notes 165·66 and accompanying

text.

331. Id. at 191 (emphasis added), Petitioners in Stolleridge cite the "secondary actor"
statement at page 191 of the Cellfral Bank four times in their Supreme Court Brief. See Brief
for Petitioners at 14, 15,27, and 42, III Re Charter Camm. Securities Litigation, 443 F.3d 987
(8th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-43). The most notable and deliberate use of the selective quotation
comes in Petitioners' conclusion: "Respondents must not 'be free from liability. ", Id. at 42
(citation omitted).
332. A good example of the ambiguity surrounding the Central Bank "secondary actor"
statement came during oral arguments before the Supreme Court in Sroneridge, where Justice
Ginsburg engaged both parties with the question of whethet there is a middle category
between Charter, who is c1eatly primarily liable, and Central Bank, that didn" do anything
deceptive?" Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43). This question clearly misses the point. The
Court based its holding in Central Bank on the language of § !O(b), which provides liability
for manipulations and deceptions, exclusively. Therefore, there can be no middle ground of
liability between a clear primary violator and one who does nothing manipulative or
deceptive. This is so, notwithstanding the extremely broad language found in Rule lOb-So
One either engages in manipulative or deceptive conduct, becoming a primary violator, or
does not, remaining immune to private suit.
333. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 (emphasis added). It is truly amazing that Justice
Kennedy, who wrote both Central Bank and Stone ridge. did not cite or discuss this quotation
in Stolleridge. Since he did not, and based upon the statement in Stoneridge that conduct can
be deceptive as well, one is left to conclude that this portion of the CemraI Bank opinion is
likely overruled by Stoneridge.
U

20081

STONERIDGE V. SCIENTIFIC-ATLANTA

897

defendants as primary violators" and that "multiple [primary] violators"
are likely "[i]n any complex securities fraud.,,334 Therefore, Central
Bank totally foreclosed liability for secondary violators by clearly
holding that secondary actors (and all other parties) must be primary
violators to be liable under § 10(b) and Rule IOb-5. 335
The majority of the Court's opinion in Central Bank supports the
understanding that § lO(b) liability requires a manipulation or deception,
and liability under deception requires the plaintiff to plead a material
misstatement or omIssIon. First, reaffirming its own precedent, the
Court states, "the language of § lO(b) gives no indication that Congress
meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or
deception.,,336 Second, the Court holds that "the statute prohibits only
the maldng of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission
of a manipulative act.,,)37 The word "only" indicates that this is an
exhaustive list including only misrepresentations, omissions, and
manipulations. When viewed in tandem, these statements appear to
enumerate all possible violations under the statutory language of § lO(b).
The first statement establishes that there are only two categories of
violations-manipulations and deceptions.
Further, the reuse of
"manipulation" and the absence of "deception" in the second statement
suggest that the Court divides deception into two sub-categories:
material misrepresentations and omissions. Thus, apparently a violation
for deceptive conduct under § I O(b) and Rule IOb-5 requires the maldng
of a material misstatement or an omission coupled with a breach of a
duty to disclose. 338
The Supreme Court in Stone ridge, however, did not even discuss
these provisions of the Celltral Bank opinion or the authority behind
them. The Eighth Circuit had clearly relied upon these sections of
Central Ballk to reach the conclusion that follows logically therefrom,
that is that a secondary actor must actually make a misstatement or
omission in order to be held liable as a primary violator under § IO(b)

334.
335.

Id.
Again, it should be noted that the special form of secondary liability known as

controlling person liabililY persists after Cemral Balik, See supra note 59.
336. Celltrai Bank,S II U.S. at 174 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Grecn, 430 U.S.
462, 464 (1977), and reaffirming Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 473 (1976))
(citations omitled).

337. Id. at 177 (citing Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473).
338. Id. See also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that a duty to
disclose is required before an omission is actionable under § lOeb»).
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and Rule IOb-S. 339 In response to this possible "reading" of the Eighth
Circuit's opinion, Justice Kennedy in Stoneridge responds:
If this conclusion were read to suggest there must be a specific oral or written
statement before there could be liability under § IO(b) or Rule IOb-5. it would
be en-oncous. Conduct itself can be deceptive, as respondents concedc?.Jo

Thus, the opinion in Stone ridge, at a minimum, caIls these statements in
Central Bank into question and arguably overrules them outright. As
noted by the Second Circuit in Wright, '''if Central Bank is to have any
real meaning, a defendant must actuaIly make a false or misleading
statement in order to be held liable under Section lO(b). ",3'11 If the
Second Circuit in Wright is correct, Celllral Bank has no real meaning
after Stoneridge! This is a rather astonishing development, especiaIly
given that the same Justice wrote both opinions.
However, perhaps the Supreme Court had begun to move away
from these statements in Central Bank prior to the opinion in Stoneridge.
Proponents of scheme liability had attempted to Llse a certain passage
from United States v. O'Hagan to limit the holding of the Court in
Central Bank?'2 However, 0 'Hagan has been radicaIly criticized by
commentators and, prior to Stoneridge, there was a good argument that it
should not be viewed as limiting Central Bank 343 O'Hagan involved an
339.

III re Charter Comme'ns, Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (2006).
340. Stoneridge lnv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 76], 769
(2008).
341. Wright v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Shapiro
v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997)).
342. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
343. Commentators describe the Court's opinion in O'Hagan with varying degrees of
criticism. Possibly the most scathing attack on O'Hagan came from Stephen Bainbridge·
during a recent panel discussion hosted by Case Western School of Law. During his remarks,
Professor Bainbridge described O'Hagan as "a cut and paste pot job, where [Justice Ginsberg]
clipped out key provisions of the . . . solicitor general's brief, reworded a few of them, but for
the most part quoted it." Professor Bainbridge went on La quip, "I assume one of the clerks
called up the [Solicitor General's] office and said, 'it's very nice to have this printed brief, but
we need the word doc copy, you know, so we can do some cutting and pasting.'" Stephen
Bainbridge, William D. Warren Professor of Law at UCLA, Panel Discussion: Case Western
Reserve School of Law Symposium on Scheme Liability, Section lOb-5, and Stoneridge
Investment
Partners
v.
Scientific-Atlanta,
{lvailable
af
http://Jaw .case.edu/centerslbusiness_law/webcast.asp?dt=20071 005 (archived webcast) alld
htlp:lllaw.case.edu/lectUfes/index.asp?lec_id=157 (general information).
In the same
discussion, Professor Bainbridge alluded to an earlier article he publishcd criticizing the lack
of business expertise on the CourL There he wrote:
In our view, this [lack of expertise] is the best explanation for the Supremc Court's
widely criticized decision in Ullited States 1'. O'Hagan, which addressed the
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attorney who was a partner for a law firm that represented Grand Met in
a potential tender offer in which Grand Met intended to buy Pillsbury
stock?4" James O'Hagan did not work on the case but he knew details
of the tender offer from a conversation with a partner who was assigned
to that case 345 Because of this information, O'Hagan bought 5000
shares of Pillsbury common stock and 2500 call options, and after Grand
Met announced its tender offer, O'Hagan sold all of his interest, netting
a gain of approximately $4.3 million. J46 Again, as with the Central Bank
opinion itself, the plaintiffs attacked by isolating a quote from 0 'Hagan
to support the contention that "[courts should] not draw undue

validity of the so~called misappropriation theory as a basis for imposing insider
trading liability under SEC Rule I Db-5. The misappropriation theory was almost
.two decades old before the Court got around finally to resolving its validity. It did
so only Jrter a major circuit splil had emerged. In resolving the case, the majority
did essentially what the government told it to do-the misappropriation section of
Justice Ginsburg's opinion repeatedly quoted from or cited to the government's
brief and ural argument, almost always approvingly. She framed the case as one
involving a "theory of liability for which the Government seeks recognition," and
adopted the central element of the government's theory. In other words, she quite
blatantly deferred to expert opinion.
Stephen M. Bainbridge & Mitu Gulati, HolV do Judges Maximize? (The Same \-Vay EvelJlbody
Else Does-Bolfnded!y): Rules of ThJl11lb ill Securities Fraud Opiniolls, 51 EMORY L. 1.83,
143 (2002). While perhaps not a "cut and paste job." the Stollcridge opinion dutifully adopts
every part of the Solicitor General's argument, once again doing "what the government told it
to do." In its summary of arguments, the Solicitor General's Brief states that:
A. The court of appeals in this case erred to the extent it held that Section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.c. 78j(b), rcaches only misstalemcnts, omissions
made while under a duty to disclose, or manipulative trading practices ....
B. Although the court of appeals erred by concluding that petitioner had failed
to satisfy Section 10(b),s deception requirement, it nevertheless correctly upheld
the district court's dismissal of petitioner's complaint, because petitioner did not
sufiiciemly plead reliance on respondents' deceptive conduct. ...
C. Allowing liability for a primary violation under the circumstances presented
here would constitute a sweeping ~xpansion of the judicially inrerred private right
or action in Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5, potentially exposing customers, vendors,
and other actors far removed from the market to billions of dollars in liability when
issuers of securities make misstatements to the market. ...
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 8-9, Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v. Scienlific-Ailanta, Inc., 128 S. Cl. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43). Perhaps
Professor Bainbridge is correct that the Supreme Court does simply lack the institutional
expertise to decide securities law cases, and therefore "quite blatantly defer[s] to expert
opinion." Bainbridge & Gulati, S/lpra, al 143.
344. 0 'Hagml, 521 U.S. at 647.
345. Id. at 648 n.1.
346. Id. at 648.
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conclusions from [the text of Ce/llral Bank].,,347 The specific quotation
normally cited reads:
The Eighth Circuit isolated the ["secondary actor"] statement just quoted and
drew from it the conclusion that § lOeb) coyers only deceptive statements or
omissions on which purchasers and sellers, and perhaps other market
participants, rely. It is evident from the question presented in Central Ballk,
however, that this Court, in the quoted passage, sought only to clarify that

secondary actors, although not subject to aiding

a~d

abetting liability, remain

subject to primary liability under § 10(b) and Rule IOb-5 for certain
conduct.

34H

As discussed above, the Court's "secondary actor" statement in Celllral
Bank, when read in context, provides no basis for the conclusion that
deceptive conduct liability under § lOeb) lies for anything other than a
material misrepresentation or omission. Further, the O'Hagan Court did
not disagree that § IOCb) requires a misstatement or omission. To the
contrary, the Court merely noted that the Eighth Circuit misapprehended
the misappropriation theory, believing it required "neither
misrepresentation nor nondisclosure.,,349 Moreover, when one reads
a 'Hagan in context, one clearly finds that "deceptive nondisclosure
[was] essential to the § lOeb) liability [at issue]. Concretely, in
[O'Hagan,] it was O'Hagan's failure to disclose his personal trading to
Grand Met and Dorsey, in breach of his duty to do so, that made his
conduct 'deceptive' under § lO(b).,,350 Still, this dicta from O'Hagan, in
some ways, foreshadowed the Court's willingness to depart from
portions of its opinion in Central Bank.
Further, some commentators had also suggested that the Supreme
Court's recent holding in SEC v. ZandJard required the conclusion that a
misstatement or omission was not required under § I OCb) and Rule IOb5.3S1 In ZanelJard, the respondent, a stock broker, sold his clients stock

347.
Atlanta.
348.
349.

Brief for Petitioners at 27, Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. ScientificInc. & Motorola, Inc., 128 S. Cl. 761 (2008) (No. 06-34).
O'Hagal/. 521 U.S. at 664 (citations omitted).
Id. at 660.
350. lei. ·at 644. One might also wonder whether the SfOlleridge opinion has negative
implications for the validity of O'Hagall and the misappropriation theory given that O'Haga/l
came after the PSLRA and arguably expanded the reach of liability under Rule IOb-5. "It is
appropriate for LIS to assume Ihnt when the [PSLRA] was enacted, Congress accepted the §
10(b) private cause of action [which at that time only included the misappropriation theory in
the lower courts] as then defined but chose to extend it no further." Sloneridge Inv. Partners,
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc .. 128 S. Cl. 761, 773 (2008).
351. SEC v. Zandford. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).

2008]

STONERIDGE V. SCIENTIFIC-ATLANTA

901

without the approval of or disclosure to the client. 352 The respondent
took the money from the stock sales and transferred it into his own
account. 353 The issue in Zandjord was "whether the alleged fraudulent
conduct was 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security'
within the meaning of the statute and the Rule.,,354 Admittedly, the
.
. . 35\·
Ive d a Illisstatement
respon dents cond uct lllVO
or omlSSlDn.
Ignoring this critical fact from the analysis, commentators used
Zwuljord for support that there is no requirement under § lO(b) that a
misstatement Dr omission be present 356 However, Zandford merely
stands for the proposition that § lOeb) should not be read restrictively,
but rather, it should be read flexibly.J57 The Court used that language to
support the proposition that "[njeither the SEC nor this Court has ever
held that there must be a misrepresentation about the value of a
particular security in order to run afoul of the Act. ,,358 The COUl1 did not
say that a misrepresentation is not required; it simply said that a
misrepresentation about a particular security's value is not required.
While there is no requirement that there be a misstatement about the
value of a particular security, there still is a requirement that there be a
misstatement or omission (or, after Stoneridge, deceptive conduct) III
order for conduct to be actionable under § lOCb) and Rule lOb-So

352.
353.
354.
355.
engaged

Id. al815.
Id.

ld.
Zalldford, 535 U.S. al 820-21. The Court specilically slaled thal lhe respondenl
in a scheme to defraud that "was deceptive because it was neither authorized by, nor
disclosed to, the Woods." !d. The Court further stated that the Woods "were duped into
believing respondent would 'conservatively invest' their assets in the stock market and that
any transactions made on their behalf would be for their benefit for the 'safety of principal and
income. '" lei. at 822. While discussing the implications of the respondent's actions, the Court
affirmed its precedent by asserting that any distinction between misstatements and omissions
is illusory in the stockbroker/client relationship, The Court affirmed that an omission is only
actionable when there is a duty to disclose. ld. at 823 (citing Chiarella v. United Stales. 445
U.S. 222 (1980)). Since tbere was an omission in this case, and thus a deception, § 10(b) and
Rule 10b~5 proscribed the respondents conduct.
356. See, e.g., Kimberly Barne, Comment, Beyolld Misrepresentations: Defining Pril1lw}'
and Secondw}' Liability Under Subsectiolls (A) and (C) of Rule lOb-5. 67 LA. L. REV. 935,
941 (2007) (noling lhat "[iJn SEC 1'. Zalldford, the Court slaled lhal il had never held thal
there must be a misrepresentation to violate Rule lOb-5 fraud provisions," but failing to
include tbe Court's important qualifying phrase "about the value of a particular security"); see
a/so ZmulJord, 535 U.S. at 820 (,,[N]either the SEC nor this Court has ever held that there
must be a misrepresentation abollt the va/lie of a particular security in order to run aroul of
lhe Act." (emphasis added)).
357. Zwuljord, 535 U.S. al 819.
358. ld. al 814 (emphasis added).
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As the preceding demonstrates, there existed in Supreme Court
precedent ample grounds for concluding that § lO(b) requires that a
defendant actually make a misstatement or omission in order to be held
liable under the Rule IOb-5 private cause of action. While only time will
tell, the Court's conclusion to the contrary seems to have severely
restricted or partially ovelTuled the Court's opinion in Central Bank.
Further, the reasoning in Stone ridge may well in time make way for
other cunning arguments that might extend the reach of liability under
the implied cause of action, the very result that tlie Court seemed so
concerned with avoiding.
IV. IN THE WAKE OF STONERIDGE, DOES SECTION I O(B) REQUIRE THAT
A SECONDARY ACTOR ACTUALLY MAKE A MISSTATEMENT (OR
OMISSION) IN ORDER TO BE HELD LIABLE AS A PRIMARY VIOLATOR
UNDER RULE IOB-5?
Rule IOb-5 and its attendant implied private cause of action
continues to engender great debate and discussion in the securities
world 359 While one has difficulty imagining securities regulation
without the Rule IOb-5 private right of action, it is entirely probable that
the 1934 Congress never dreamt of such a private light of action when
enacting § lOeb), let alone one so expansive. 360 Louis Loss and loel
Seligman in their influential treatise, Securities Regulation, write:
The Rule 10b-5 story tempts the pen. For it is difticult to think of another
instance in the entire corpus juris in which the interaction of the legislative,
administrative mlemaking, and judicial processes has produced so much from
so little. What is more remarkable is that the whole development was

359. See The Federalist Society Online Debate Series: Sloneridge InvestmclH v.
Scientific Atlanta. THE FEDERALIST SOCtETY, Feb. 19, 2008, http://www.fedsoc.org/dcbates/dblid.16/defauIL3sp (including commentary from Stephen Bainbridge, UCLA
Law professor; Jay Brown, Denver Sturm College of Law professor; Ted Frank, American
Enterprise Institute; Andrew Pincus, Mayer Brown; Robert Prentice, University of Texas at
Austin - McCombs School of Business professor; and Andrea Seidt, Ohio Assistant Attorney
General).
360.
"In § lO{b), Congress prohibited manipulative or deceptive acts in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities. it envisioned thaI the SEC wOllld e1lforce rhe stalf/tory
prohibition Throlfgh admillistrative alld injullctive actiollS. Of course, a private plaintiff no~v
may bring suit against violators of § lOCb)." Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164. 173 (1994).
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unplanned .... [Tlhe Rule [is] "" horse of dubious pedigree but very neet of
foot.,,361

Then Justice Rehnquist stated in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores that the private right of action under Rule IOb-5 is "a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.,,)62 Of the
origins of Rule IOb-5, Milton V. Freeman, its primary author, has said:
[Slince people keep talking about 10b-5 as my rule, and since r have told a lot
of people about it, I think it would be appropriate for me now to make a brief
statement of what actually happened when IOb-5 was adopted, where it would
be written down and be available to everybody, not just the people who are
willing to listen to me.
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was silting in my office in the
S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who
was then the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have
just been on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C.
Regional Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of
some company in Boston who is going around buying up the Slack of his
company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling
them that the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are
going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there
anything we can do about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary
and I looked at Section lO(b) and I looked at Section 17 [of the Securities Act
of 1933], and I put them together, and the only discussion that we had there
was where "in connection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we
decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't
remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a
piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All of the commissioners read
the rule and they tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said
anything except Sumner Pike who said, "Well," he said, '\ve are against fraud,
aren't weT' That is how it happened.
361.
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 59, § 9-B-3. Justice Stevens in the dissent disagrees
and argues that the 1934 Congress did indeed intend such a cause of action. He argues:
In light of the history of court-created remedies and specifically the history of
implied causes of action under § IOCb), the Court is simply wrong when it states
that Congress did not impliedly authorize this private cause of action "when it first
enacted the statute." Courts near in time to the enactment of the securities laws
recognized that the principle in [Tex. & Poco Ry. Co. 1'. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916),] applied to the securities Jaws. Congress enacted § J O(b) with lhe
understanding that federal courts respected the principle that every wrong would
have a remedy. Toclay's decision simply cuts back further on Congress' intended
remedy. 1 respectfully dissent.
Stoneridge lnv. Partners, LLC v. Sciemific-A1Janla, 128 S. Cl. 761, 781-82 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted).
362. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug SlOres, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
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Louis [Loss] is absolutely right that I never thought that twenty [now
sixty]-odd years later it would be the biggest thing that had ever happened. It
was intended to give the Commission power to deal with this problem. It had
no relation in the Commission's contemplation to private proceedings. How it
got into private proceedings was bv the ingenuity of members of the private
3G3
Bar slarling with the Kardoll case.

Still today, Rule IOb-S develops and grows in this same
undisciplined and often unpredictable way. First, the Supreme Court or
Congress acts in rather limited ways to either expand 'or contract Rule
lOb-So Then, in response to judicial or congressional action, the
plaintiffs' bar invents a "new" theory of liability. Finally, the defense
bar demurs, sending the matter back to the courts for another cycle.
Initially, Rule lOb-S seemed only to expand as it passed through these
machinations, growing ever larger and spreading its boughs like a "cedar
rot] Lebanon" or a tree planted by the "abundant waters.,,364 However,

363. Millon V. Freeman, Administrative Procedllres, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922 (1967).
364. The cedar of Lebanon is an important symbol throughout the history of many
cultures. One familiar example comes from the book of Ezekiel. where Ezekiel compares
Egypt to Assyria. calling Assyria a great cedar tree:
Who can be compared to your majesty?
Consider Assyria. once a great cedar in Lebanon.
with beautiful brunches overshadowing the forest;
illOwered on high.
its lop above the thick foliage.
The waters nourished it.
deep springs made it grow tall;
their streams flowed all around its base
und sent their channels
to all the trees of the field.
So it towered higher
than all of the other trees on the field;
its boughs increased
and its branches grew long.
all of the birds in the air
nested in its boughs, and all of the beasts of the field
gave birth under ils branches;
<lll of the nations lived in its shade.
It was majestic in beauty,
with its spreading boughs,
for its roots went down to abundant waters.
Ez.ekiel 31 :'2-7 (New International Version). However, the passage does not end well for the
majestic ceciuf. It was proud of its height and, "according to its wickednessL God} cast it
aside, and the most ruthless of foreign nations cut it down and left it. ... [iJts branches lay
broken in all the ravines or the land." !d. at 10-12. "Therefore, no other trees by the waler ure
to ever tower so proudly on high, lifting their laps above the thick foliage. No other trees by
the water reach sllch height; they arc destined for death, for the earth below, among mortal
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with Blue Chip Stamps, Ernst, Santa Fe, and related cases, the Supreme
Court began pruning the judicial oak. Congress joined in the pruning
with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") and
similar legislative enactments.
Perhaps the most significant "pruning" to date occurred in Central
Bank, where the Supreme Court sawed off the huge limb of secondary
liability and aiding and abetting. In response, a new cycle began with
the plaintiffs' bar ingeniously attempting to "graft" a new limb of
secondary liability onto the nub left by Central Bank. As discussed
above, this new silviculture goes by the name of "substantial
participation" and now "scheme liability." The Ninth Circuit cultivated
this new limb of liability.
In Stoneridge, however, the Supreme Court appears to have
removed this unnecessary growth. Further, the Court has essentially
pronounced that this "mighty oak" should grow no more. Its reach,
according to Stone ridge, is no greater than what it was in 1995 when
Congress enacted the PSLRA. Given the Court's obvious concern that
the Rule 10b-5 private right of action not be expanded, this may be the
most important and enduring holding of Stone ridge. One is left to
wonder whether in the future courts may be forced to spend a great deal
of time figuring out the contours of the private right of action as it
existed in 1995, when Congress "accepted the § lO(b) private cause of
action ... but chose to extend it no further,,,365 in order to determine
whether imposing liability for the specific acts alleged would
impermissibly expand the private right of action.
This, of course, introduces incredible uncertainty and presents a
host of issues with which the lower courts will be forced to grapple. For
example, did Congress "accept . . . the private cause of action" as
defined by the Supreme Court only, or did Congress "accept" rulings of
the lower courts as well? If the lower courts as well, which opinions did
Congress accept? If Congress did not accept any of the opinions of the
lower courts, then what of issues that had not yet come before the
Supreme Court, or issues, such as scienter, that had been specifically
reserved by the Court?
The case of scienter may be particularly instructive as to issues that
may arise following Stoneridge. Professor Hazen, in his excellent

men, with those who go down to the pit." ld. ill 14. Perhaps Stoneridge indicates that the §
lO(b) private calise of action is headed for a similar fate unless rescued by Congress.
365. Stolle ridge, 128 S. Ct. at 765.

QLR

906

[Vol. 26:839

Treatise 017 rhe Law of Securiries Regulatioll, writes of the scienter
requirement:
It is clear that the scienter requirement is satisfied by a showing of intentional
misrepresentation made with the intent to deceive. But what about conduct
that falls short of willful misrepresentation? In reaching its decisions in
Hoell/elder and Aaron the Court did not decide whether a showing of reckless
conduct would satisfy the scienter requirement. It has long been the rule at
common law that, at least under certain circumstances, the showing of reckless
disregard of the truth or the making of a statement with no belief in its tl111h
constitutes scienter in an action for deceit. While the recklessness question
remains unsettled at the Supreme Court level, the vast majority of the circuit
and district court decisions have found that recklessness is sufficient to state a
.
366
claIm under I Db-S.

Since, as Professor Hazen notes, "the recklessness question remains
unsettled at the Supreme Court level,,,367 what did Congress accept in
1995 with the enactment of the PSLRA? Did Congress accept the
decisions of "the vast majority of the circuit and district court[s]" in
favor of recklessness? Or, did Congress merely accept the conclusion of
Ernst and leave the question of "recklessness" for a future Supreme
Court to decide?
The language of the PSLRA on scienter is no help in resolving this
issue. It merely provides:
Required state of mind - In any private action arising under this chapter in
which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the
defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall. with
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, slate wilh
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
368
' d slale 0 fmm
"d .
1IlC require

While "accepting" the holding in Ernst that scienter or a "state of mind"
is required, the PSLRA in no way indicates what that state of mind
should be. Further, the fact that the recklessness standard is accepted in
common law fraud would likely prove of little value as well, because
"[sJection 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal
Jaw.,,369

366.
367.
368.
369.

HAZEN, sl/pra note 38, § 12.8[3].
fd.
IS U.S.CA. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 2008).
SIOI/eridge, 128 S. Ct. at 771.
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Thus, would it be an expansion of the implied cause of action for
the Court to hold that a plaintiff in a § lO(b) case need only show
recklessness? If the PSLRA accepted the "vast majority of' lower court
opinions, then the answer would appear to be in the negative, as the
"accepted" cause of action would include recklessness. However, if the
PSLRA accepted the implied cause of action as developed by Supreme
Court opinions only, it seems that endorsing a standard less than intent
would expand the cause of the action and would therefore run afoul of
Stolleridge. At the rate that the Supreme Court accepts Rule 10b-5
cases, it may well take decades for this and similar issues to be resolved
absent Congressional action.
Returning to the topic of this Article, Stolleridge brings less clarity
than promised by the words of the opinion to the question whether §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require a misstatement or omission coupled with a
duty to disclose. Justice Kennedy seems to address this question at the
very outset of the opinion with an answer of "obviously not." He writes:
The Court of Appeals concluded petitioner had not alleged that respondents
engaged in a deceptive act within the reach of the § 10(b) private right of
action, noting that only misstatements, omissions by one who has a duty Lo
disclose, and manipulative trading practices (where "manipulative" is a term of
art) arc deceptive within the meaning of the rule. If this conclusion were read
to suggest there must be a spec(fic oral or written statement before there cOllld
be liability LInder § lOeb) or Rule IOb-5, it would be erroneOllS. Conduct itself
can be deceptive, as respondents concede.
In this case, moreover,
respondents' course of conduct included both oral and written statements, such
as the backdated contracts agreed to by Charter and respondents.
A different interpretation of the holding from the Court of Appeals opinion
is that the court was stating only that any deceptive statement or act
respondents made was not actionable because it did not have the requisite
proximate relation to the investors' harm. That conclusion is consistent with
our own determination that respolldcllts' acts or s{atcmclHs were not relied
upon by the investors and that, as a result, liabilitv cannot be imposed upon
370
.
respondents..

In two rather short paragraphs, the Court dismisses the relatively settled
understanding that a misstatement or omission is required as
"erroneous," establishes that conduct can also be deceptive within the
meaning of § lO(b), notes that the "respondents' course of conduct
included both oral and written statements," and concludes that liability
will not lie under § lO(b) and Rule IOb-5 because there is not the

370.

Id. at 769 (emphasis added and citalions omilled).
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"requisite proximate relation" between the respondents' course of
conduct and "the investors' harm," that is there was no reliance. Thus, it
would seem that the answer is clear: a misstatement or omission is not
required because conduct can also satisfy the deceptive requirement in §
lO(b).

However, as noted herein, the Court goes on to discuss reliance, the
ostensible basis for its ruling.371 Consistent with its precedent, the
Supreme Court first found that the conduct alleged was proscribed by
the stlltute,372 and then proceeded to the essential element of reliance. 373
Accordingly, the Court evidenced a three-prong understanding of
reliance, in that reliance may be based only on (1) proof of actual
reliance, (2) "an omission of a material fact by one with a duty to
disclose, ,,374 or (3) "the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, [where] reliance is
presumed when the statements at issue become public.,,375 Under this
framework for reliance, the Court held:
Neither presumption applies here. Respondents had no duty LO disclose; and
their deceptive acts were not communicated to the public. No member of the

investing public had knowledge, either actual or presumed, of respondents'
deceptive acts during the relevant times. Petitioner, as a result, cannot show

reliance upon any of respondents' actions except in an indirect chain that we
376
1 tty.
fiIn d too remote j .or I·Ia b·l·

After holding that none of the three methods of reliance were
sufficiently alleged by the petitioner, the Court continued its analysis by
reviewing the petitioner's argument that scheme liability provides a

371. Not expanding the § lO(b)/Rule IOb-5 private right of action seems La be the Court's
real concern. Reliance appears (Q be merely the means to accomplishing that end in this case.
372. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
172 (1994) ("Firsl, [lhe courl has 10] delermine[]lhe scope of conduct prohibiled by § lO(b):')
The Court in Stone ridge did in fact determine that § lOeb) proscribes the conduct engaged in
by the respondents when it held, "[c]onduct itself can be deceptive . ... [R]espondents' course
of conduct included both oral and written statements, such as the backdated contract" agreed
to by Charter and respondents." SWl1eridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769. Unfortunately, the Court came
to this conclusion in two short paragraphs without any significant analysis. The next question
is whether "all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule lOb-5 are mel." Cemral
Bank, 511 U.S. a119l.
373. Stolle ridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 ("[T]he 'requisite causal connection between a
defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury' exists as a predicate for liability."
(quotiog Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988))).
374. ld. (ciling Affilialed Ule Cilizensof Ulah v. Uniled Stales, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
( 1972».
375. ld. (ciling Basic. 485 U.S. al 247).
376. ld.
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sufficient basis for proving reliance. 377 The petitioners argued that "the
financial statement Charter released to the public was a natural and
expected consequence of respondents' deceptive acts; had respondents
not assisted Charter, Charter's auditor would not have been fooled, and
the financial statement would have been a more accurate reflection of
Charter's financial condition"; therefore, liability is appropriate under
the third method of reliance based on public statements. Jn The Court
simply responded by stating that "this approach does not answer the
objection that petitioner did not in fact rely upon the respondents' own
deceptive conduct.,,379
In all events we conclude respondents' deceptive acts, which were not
disclosed to the investing public, are too remote to satisfy the requirement of
reliance. It was Charter, not respondents, that misled its auditor and filed
fraudulent financial statements; /lothing respondents (Ud lI1ade it necessarv or
380
inevitable/of Charter to record [he transactions as it did.
.

Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Stolleridge, seems to think
that the majority propounded a new rule that, in order to establish
reliance in a case such as this, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant's conduct (or possibly misstatements not communicated to the
plaintiff or the market) "made it necessary or inevitable for" the primary
actor to make a misstatement upon which the plaintiff relies or about
which one of the presumptions mentioned herein applies 3s1 Thus,
following Stoneridge, in order to be held liable as a primary violator, a
secondary actor must either (1) make a misstatement or omission
SlOrzeridge, 128 S. Cl. at 770-71.
ld. at 770 (emphasis added). In other words, the respondents should be liable
because of another's misstatement or omission, a result that was specifically eliminated in
Central Balik. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
379. ld. (emphasis added).
380. ld. (emphasis added).
381. Whether Justice Kennedy actually intended to create sllch a test is certainly
debatable. Still, the words of the opinion seem to suggest that if the conduct of the vendors
had been of such that it made Charter's misstatements necessary or inevitable, then liability
would have been found. Justice Stevens in the dissent seems to agree. He states:
The Court's next faulty premise is that petitioner is required to allege that
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola made it "necessary or inevitable for Charter to
record the transactions as it did" in order to demonstrate reliance. Because the
Court of Appeals did not base iL<; holding on reliance grounds, the fairest course. to
petitioner would be for the majority to remand to the Court of ,~ppeals to dct:rmlnc
whether petitioner properly alleged reliance, under a correct view of what ~ 1O(b)
377.

378.

covers.
Stolleridge, 128 S. Ct. at 775-76 (Srcvens, J., dissenting) (ciLalions omilleu).
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(thereby making actual reliance possible or one of the presumptions
applicable), or (2) engage in deceptive conduct, which can include
misstatements or omissions that are not communicated to the plaintiff or
the market, that makes it "necessary or inevitable" that the plimary actor
will make a misstatement upon which the plaintiff relies (either actually
or via one of the presumptions of reliance).
The first option is undisputed and the result would be the same
under any of the tests discussed herein. However, in many cases
involving secondary actors, the issue is that there are no misstatements
(or omissions coupled with a duty to disclose) that have been
communicated to the plaintiffs or the market. Therefore, according to
Justice Stevens, it appears that the issue is not whether the secondary
actor actually made a misstatement or omission, but rather whether the
secondary actor's deceptive conduct makes it "necessary or inevitable"
that the pIimary actor will make a misstatement or omission upon which
the plaintiff can rely or establish a presumption. As the following will
clarify, however, this author wonders whether this is a distinction
without a difference.
In order to apply the purported "necessary or inevitable" test of
reliance, the first thing a court must do is define the terms necessary and
inevitable. "Inevitable" is defined as "incapable of being avoided or
evaded.,,382 What secondary actor conduct would maJee it such that the
primUlY actor's making a misstatement would be "incapable of being
avoided?" Among other things, "necessary" is defined as "having the
character of something that is logically required or logically inevitable or
that cannot be denied without involving contradiction," "that is
inevitably fixed or determined or produced by a previous condition of
things," "acting under compUlsion," or "absolutely required.,,38J
"Necessary" is seemingly the more permissive of the two terms, and one
might speculate that any conduct by a secondary actor that makes a
misstatement by the primary violator inevitable would also make it
necessary. Thus, a more important question might ask what conduct by
a secondary actor would make it nccessOI)' that the primary actor make a
misstatement. What sort of conduct by a secondary actor would make a
misstatement by the primary violator "logically required or logically
inevitable" or "absolutely required?"

382.
383.
(2002).

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1157 (2002).
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1510-11
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The Supreme Court gave no hint as to the application of this
purported test, or even that it was establishing a test, in the Stoncridge
opinion. Regardless, given the Court's statement in Stoneridge, the
standard must require more than the conduct of the Vendors in that case.
Further, based upon its reversal and remand of Simpson, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the conduct of the defendants there did not make a
misstatement by Homestore.com necessary or inevitable either. Even
the egregious facts of the Enron debacle that formed the basis of the
Regents case apparently do not satisfy the necessary or inevitable
standard, given that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case just
seven days after Stoncridge and on the same day that it reversed and
remanded Simpson. FUl1her, based upon the Court's ruling that § lO(b)
liability is not to be expanded, whatever secondary actor conduct alleged
to have made it necessary or inevitable that a primary violator make a
misstatement must also be such a character that it not expand § lO(b)
liability beyond its limits at the time of the PSLRA in 1995.
Is it possible that the only conduct by a secondary actor that makes
it necessary or inevitable that a primary violator will make a
misstatement is when the secondary actor somehow makes that
misstatement itself and thereby becomes a primary violator? If so, does
the Stone ridge opinion create what mathematicians call a "null set"-a
group that actually contains nothing? Or, to put it another way, did the
Stone ridge opinion in fact require that a secondary actor actually make a
misstatement or omission in order to be held liable under § lO(b) and
Rule IOb-5 while professing to do the very opposite? Or is the
"necessary and inevitable" standard criticized by Justice Stevens a
requirement at all?3S4 Could it be that the majority simply responded to
the petitioner's argument that Charter's inf1ated financial statements
were the "natural and expected consequence of respondents' deceptive
actsT'385 Unfortunately, absent Congressional action, these questions
will only be answered through slow and costly securities litigation.
This result is regrettable and could have been avoided if the Court
had been careful to issue a principled ruling based upOli precedent.
However, instead of issuing a ruling based upon principle and precedent,
the Court in Stoneridge violated its own admonition in Central Bank and
based its ruling primarily on policy grounds. Ironically, the calls for
securities litigation rulings based upon policy grounds are usually made
by those extending liability more than by those looking to limit it.
384.
385.

S'tolleridge, 128 S. CI. at 775 (Steven, J., dissenting).

Id. at 770.
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Frequently, the plaintiffs in securities fraud cases are very sympathetic,
such as the Enron shareholders in Regents, and the deep-pocketed
secondary actors often appear less than noble, such as the banks in
Regents. Accordingly, these cases often present a situation where there
is a strong feeling on the part of many that fairness demands that
someone should be held liable. a feeling that can often override a faithful
application of the law.
Indeed, lower courts applying the "substantial participation" test
and scheme liability have not done so in fidelity to Supreme Court
precedent. Rather, the rulings often seem to be based upon policy
considerations and feelings regarding what is fair in a given situation.
One illustration was the ZZZZ Best court's statement that Ernst & Young
"should be liable under Section lO(b)/Rule lOb_S.,,386 Surely to arrive at
this conclusion, the court used some sort of policy considerations.
Further, the commentators who argue for an expansive test such as the
"substantial participation" test or scheme liability argue mainly on
policy grounds. 387 However, the Supreme Court specifically foreclosed
reliance on such policy considerations in Central Ballk: 388
The SEC poinLs to various policy arguments in support of the lOb-5 aiding
and abetting cause of action. Il argues, for examplc, that the aiding and
abelling cause of action detcrs sccondary actors from contributing to fraudulent
activities and ensures t!lat defrauded plaintiffs are made whole.
Policy considerations cannot ovclTide our interpretation of thc text and
structure of the Act, except to the extent that thcy may help to show that
adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result "so bizarre" that
Congress could not have intended it. That is not the case here.
Extending the IOb-5 cause of action to aiders and abettors no doubt makes
the civil remedy more far reaching, but it does not follow that the objectives of
the statute are bener served. Secondary liability for aiders and abettors exacts
costs that may disserve the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in tile securities
389
markets.

Further, the Court states that "[tJhe issue ... is not whether imposing
private civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but whether
aiding and abetting is covered by the statute.,,390
However, in
Stolleridge, Justice Kennedy. also the author of Central Ballk, ignored
386. III re ZZ'Z2 Best. 864 F. Supp. 960. 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
387. See Prentice, slIpra note 18, at 7'27-32.
388. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
ISS (1994).
389. /d. (citations omitted).
390. Id. at 177.
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his own admonition not to rule primarily on policy grounds and crafted
an opinion that exhibits strained and unprincipled reasoning that hardly
addresses the language of the statute, and rather seemed entirely
motivated by the majority's conclusion that liability under § lOeb)
should not be extended 391 This is somewhat ironic given that most of
the calls for a decision based upon policy are made by people who view

391. The following comments made to II recent online debate about Stollcridge echo
these complaints about the opinion and demonslrate that it will likely be castigated in years to
corne.

Jay Brown
The Court's reasoning had nothing to do with the language of the statute or
with common law notions of fraud. In facl, the Court made clear that neither

controlled.

Instead, the decision arose because of the Court's dislike for the

implied right of action under Rule lOb-5. Unwilling to do away with the cause of
action, the Court concluded that it would not extend the reach any further than was
already the casco To the Court, allowing vendors to be sued was an extension. As a
result, the use of reliance was merely an expediency designed to exonerate the
vendors in this case (as evidenced by the refusal of the Court to remand on the issue
of reliance).
The use of an expediency rather than thoughtful analysis based upon the
language of the provision will ultimately be counterproductive. It does not, in fact,
result in the exoneration of all vendors. For example, while the Court denied cert in
the Enron case, it is back at the District Court (the case was on appeal from the
district court's decision to grant class certification) and the plaintiff:" will try to
show reliance on the statements of the investment bankers (apparently through
reliance on analyst reports and recommendations). In other circumstances, issuers
will make disclosure of vendor contracts (sec Item 1.01 of Form 8-K, requiring
companies to report any "material definitive agreement not made in the ordinary
course of business"), presumably creating a strong basis for arguing reliance.
The case is sloppy, not controlled by legal principles, and likely to result in
more rather than less litigation.
Robert Prentice
If we truly dislike courts that make law, we cannot be happy with Stoneridge,
which is an activist, policy-driven decision.
The Court's true policy-driven motives shine through clearly.in the opinion.
After holding in previous cases that policy considerations should be considered
only to ensure that a particular statutory interpretation is not "bizarre," the
Stoneridgc majority ignored that self-imposed limitation and reached its preferred
result with completely one-sided policy analysis. There is certainly a case to be
made that private litigation under Sec. IO(b) carries more disadvantages than
benefits, but there is also substantial empirical evidence to the contrary. Given the
Court's concession that Congress has approved and ratified the private right to sue,
that policy debate should have been left to Congress rather than resolved by the
CourL
The Federalist Society Online Debate Series: Stoneridge Investment v. Scientific Atlanta, THE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY, Feb. 19, 200S, hllp:llwww.fed·soc.org/debales/dblid.I 6/default.asp.

914

QLR

[Vol. 26:839

the plaintiffs, not the defendant-secondary actors, as sympathetic parties
deserving of the benefits of a policy ruling,
That being said, the Court should have followed its own statements
in Central Bank and faithfully applied the text of the statute, consulting
policy considerations as little as possible, and only then to elucidate the
consideration of the statute and its own precedent. Both parties, as the
Court noted in Celllrai Bank, can often forward policy arguments, For
example, in Sroneridge, an oft-heard policy argument for the plaintiffs is
compensation of the Enron shareholders, In addition to that argument,
many of the same policy arguments offered in Celllrai Bonk were again
put forward in Sroneridge, such as both deterrence and the fairness in
holding parties who participated in some way responsible,
Significant policy arguments were also made against scheme
liability, The Court set forth many of these in the Sroneridge opinion,
For example, the Court suggests that rampant secnrities litigation
undermines the efficiency and competitiveness of the US, capital
markets, causing a loss of capital to overseas markets,392 In addition, the
Court seems concerned that the adoption of scheme liability will cause
parties dealing with publicly-traded companies to engage in redundant,
cost-increasing behavior without any corresponding reduction in
fraudulent activity or other societal benetits 393 The Court suggests that
parties dealing with publically-traded companies would likely begin
requiring the other company to attest to the accounting treatment of the
deal 394 Further, arguably, this would then be the subject of audits for
the vendor. 395

392. Some have also argued that vexatious secuIitics litigation provides a windfall for
plaintiffs attorneys, while doing little LO benefit those truly harmed by securities fraud. See.
e.g., Panel Discussion: C[lse Western Reserve School of Lmv Symposium on Scheme

Liability, Section lOb-5, and Stoneridge lnveSlment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, supra note
343,
393, Stone ridge Inv, Partners, LLC v, Scientific-Atbnta, 128 S, Ct. 761,772 (2008) ("As
noted in Celltral Balik., contracting parties might find it necessary to protect against these
threuts, raising the costs or doing business.").
394, /d, Stephen Bainbridge, author of THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SARBANES-OXLEY:
UNDERSTANDING HolV SARBANES-OXLEY AfFECTS YOUR BlISINESS (2007), agrees and
notes thaI:
If scheme liability is imposed, however, the risks ussociated with these
practices will escalate significantly. To be sure, there afe already some risk that the
SEC or Justice Department will pursue these roundtrip transuclions, but it seems
safe to assume that private party liability exposure would raise the Slakes
significantly.
The net effect will be to bring significant pressure 10 bear on the Motorola's of
the world to subject these sort of contracts La effective internal audits. In turn,
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The important point of this discussion is not that policy arguments
must dictate one result or the other, as such arguments can be forwarded
by both sides, but rather that the Supreme Court should have followed its
own statements in Celllrai Bank and should not have ruled in Stolle ridge
on policy grounds 39G The proper role of the courts is to interpret laws as
written; if policy arguments are helpful in that context, then they should
be considered. However, when the language of the statute is clear on its
face, then the courts are duty bound to interpret the statute as written,
and the proper place for those who are disappointed with the application
of the statute to voice their policy arguments is to the legislature. 397 As
Alexander Hamilton appropriately stated in the Federalist Paper No. 78,
"[tlhe courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be
disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence

because nobody will want to sign orf on the accounting treatment for transactions
that might push the edge of the envelope without clearing it with their auditors,
there will be even greater involvement of external auditors in the contracting
process.
You might say, well, so what? Arter aU, aren't internal controls supposed to
crack down on wrongdoing? Well, yes, but. Remember Motorola didn't issue the
misleading financial statements. It didn't help prepare them. We're not talking
about Charter's 404 duties. We're talking about imposing more extensive and
demanding 404 requirements on firms in connection with somebody else's
disclosures.
There's a reason, after all, that finns seldom put internal control performance
provisions in contracts with customers or suppliers. It's bad enough trying to
monitor your own internal controls. Trying to monitor somebody else's can be
orders of magnitude more difficult and expensive.
Posting
of
Stephen
Bainbridge
to
BusinessAssociationsBlog.com,
http://www.businessassocialionsblog.com (Oct. 3, 2007).
395. Stolleridge, 128 S. CL at 772.
396. Justice Stevens would disagree with this statement in that he appears to consider
Cel/tral Balik, as well as Stol/eridge, an example of the Court engaging in judicial policy
making. In his dissent in Stoneridge, he states, ''\\.'hile I recognize that the Central Bank
opinion provides a precedent for judicial policymaking decisions in this area of the law, I
respectfully dissent from the Court's continuing campaign to render the private cause of
action under § lOeb) toothless." /d. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, the Cellfral
Bank opinion, while later noting policy arguments, first proffered solid legal arguments based
upon the language of § lOeb), and compelled the conclusion that aiding and abetting should
not be a part of the implied cause of action. Unlike Celltral Bank, Stolleridge does not exhibit
such thoughtful consideration of the law. Further, Justice Stevens, who also wrote tbe dissent
in Central Balik, seems mOlivated primarily by the concern that § 10(b) not be "rendered
toothless," and it is difficult for this author to see how expanding the reach of a judicially
created cause
action demonstrates any more judicial restraint than limiting one would.
Judicial restraint is only demonstrated when the Court limits itself to ruling based upon the
law.
397. See Grundl"est, slIpra nOle 146. at 15.
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would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the
legislative body.,,398
Those who advocate expansion of the implied cause of action under
§ lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 using the "substantial participation" test or
scheme liability based on policy grounds essentially argue that the courts
should "substitut[e] ... their pleasure to that of the legislative body.,,399
Equally, the Court, when rejecting scheme liability without careful legal
analysis and based upon the conviction that the implied cause of action
not be expanded', subjects itself to the assertion that it engaged in judicial
policy-making.
This result, however, cannot be tolerated in a
government that relies on the separation of powers, which envisions
different bodies in the government with distinct roles. Unlike the
legislature, the courts do not have the resources or the time to thoroughly
examine these policy arguments. The current security statutes represent
the legislature's position on these issues, and thus, while it is desirable
that secUI1ties fraud be punished, the Supreme Court rightly concluded
in Celltral Bank, based on the text of the statute, that "not every instance
of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 1O(b).,,400
If the Court in Stoneridge had focused more on the text of the statute and
less on crafting and considering policy arguments, perhaps a better
reasoned opinion would have resulted.
The preceding is not put forward to argue that the Court reached the
wrong result. As this Article endeavors to make clear, the rejection of
scheme liability was the correct decision. Rather, the preceding is meant
to demonstrate that even reaching the right conclusion with careless
legal reasoning is not good for a government based upon the separation
of powers where the roles of the jUdiciary and the legislature are well
defined. Further, as demonstrated herein, decisions based upon policy
rather than legal argument fi'equently bring about uncertainty and
unintended consequences that inexorably lead to more litigationarguably, in Stoneridge, the very result the Supreme Court seemed so
desperate to avoid.
In conclusion, one is left to wonder why the majority would engage
in such clear policy-based analysis, especially given that most of the
justices forming the majority have expressed their desires to avoid such
analysis. One reason is made abundantly clear in the opinion and herein:
the majority's dislike for the § IO(b)lRule lOb-5 private right of action
398.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton).

399.

ld.

400.

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
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and desire that it not be expanded. 401 However, there is perhaps another
reason that is not as clear from the opinion. Perhaps the Court chose to
use the reliance element rather than interpreting "deceptive" in § 1O(b)
in order to preserve the right of the SEC to pursue the Vendors and
similarly-situated defendants.'J02
Private plaintiffs must establish
reliance in order to prevail in a § lO(b)/Rule IOb-5 action, but the SEC,
on the other hand, need not show reliance in a criminal or civil
enforcement action 403 Both the SEC and private plaintiffs, however,
must establish either manipulation or deception. 404 A ruling based upon
the statutory language of § I O(b), therefore, would have insulated the
Vendors and those similarly situated from actions by both the SEC and
private plaintiffs 405 By contrast, the ruling in Slolleridge preserves the
right of the SEC to proceed against such actors. 40fi Perhaps the Court did
feel that the Vendors really were bad actors but felt that the SEC was the
proper party to pursue such actors. On the other hand, perhaps the Court
felt that the PSLRA demanded such a conclusion. Due to the nature of
the opinion, however, many more questions are raised than answers
given, and courts and commentators will likely speculate about the
meaning and moti vation of this opinion for years to come.
CONCLUSION

Central Ballk took securities litigation under § IOb-5 to the
threshold of clarity but no further. In doing so, the Court created a great
deal of uncertainty with regard to the scope of primary liability under §
lOeb) and Rule IOb_5. 407 The lower courts continued to struggle to
define the proper scope of primary liability, and the circuit courts of
appeal split over this issue on two separate occasions. 408 Both of these
splits related specifically to the question whether § 10(b) requires that a

401. See supra note 224 and accompanying [ext.
402. Or, perhaps more accurately, the Solicitor General argued this [ur these reasons and
the Court dutifully adopted the government's arguments. See supra nole 343.
403. HAZEN, supra note 38, § 12.10 ("Reliance is an element of a plivate claim under
Rule IOb-5, bm not in enforcement actions brought by the government.") (citing SEC v.

Alliance Leasing Corp., 28 Fed. Appx. 648 (9th Cir. 2002); S.E.c. v. McCaskey. No. 98 CIY.
6153(SWK), 2001 WL 1029053 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). q: United States v. Davis. 226 F.3cl 346,
358 (5th Cir. 2000).
404. See gellerally HAZEN. supra note 38, § 12.
405. See supra Part IIL
406. See Sllpra note 403 and accompanying text.
407. Sec supra note 18 and accompanying text.
408.

See sl/pra notes 18 and 28 and accompanying text.
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secondary actor actually make a misstatement or omission in order to be
held liable as a primary violator under Rule IOb_S 409 In Stoncridge, this
issue was specifically presented to the Supreme Court for its
resolution 410
As demonstrated herein, there existed adequate legal grounds for
concluding that § IOCb) and Rule IOb-S require a manipulation,
misstatement, or omission by one with a duty to disclose,4ii However,
the Supreme Court in Stoncridge rejected this argument without even
discussing the relevant authority, and ruled instead based upon the
reliance requirement,4l1 While the Court reached what is arguably the
right result, it did so in an opinion that is clearly driven by policy
considerations more than a careful and thoughtful analysis of the law.
This attempt at policymaking seems to be motivated by a dislike for the
implied private light of action under § lOeb) and Rule IOb-S, and clearly
413
states that the private right of action should not be expanded.
Whether
this decision will have its intended effect, only time and litigation will
tell; but, as noted herein, the opinion raises many more questions than it
answers, and is therefore likely to create more uncertainty and litigation
in the future as the lower courts attempt to decipher and apply the
Court's decision in Stoneridge.

411.

See SlIpnt Pm1 II herein.
See supra nOle 29 and accompanying text.
See .wpm Part III.

412.
4 J3.

See slIpra Part IV.
See slIpra nOlc 224 and accompanying text.

409.
41 D.

